DISCHARGE
OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE WITNESS
Rule 119,
Section 7, Rules of Court
General rule:
It is the duty of the prosecutor to include all the accused in the
complaint/information.
Exception:
Prosecutor may ask the court to discharge one of them after complying
with the conditions prescribed by law. [Rule 119, Sec. 17] This applies only
when the information has already been filed in court.
What is a state
witness?
A state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged
with the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his
consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the State.
On
whose motion should the application for discharge of the state
witness be made?
On motion of the
prosecution.
When should the
application for discharge of the state witness be made?
It should be made
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case.
What is the
procedure?
1. Before resting its case, the prosecution
should file a motion to discharge the accused as state witness with his
consent.
2. The court will require the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of the proposed state witness at a hearing
in order to support the discharge. It need not be a trial type hearing.
3. The court will determine if the
requisites of giving the discharge are present. Evidence adduced in support of
the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial.
4. If the court is satisfied, it will discharge
the state witness. The discharge is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the
witness later fails or refuses to testify.
5. If the court denies the motion for discharge,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible as evidence.
What are the
requisites in order for a person to be discharged as a state witness?
1. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
2. There is no direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of the said accused;
3. The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
4. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
5. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
What is the meaning
of “absolute necessity” of the testimony of the proposed state witness?
It means that there
is no other evidence to establish the offense other than the testimony of the
accused. For example, where an offense is committed in conspiracy and
clandestinely, the discharge of one of the conspirators is necessary in
order to provide direct evidence of the commission of the
crime. No one else other than one of the
conspirators can testify on what happened among them. [Chua v. CA (1996)]
He alone has the
knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or
strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution. [Flores v.
Sandiganbayan (1983)]
This requirement is
aimed to curtail miscarriage of justice. Absolute necessity of the testimony of
the defendant, whose discharge is requested must be shown, if the discharge is
to be allowed, and it is the court upon which the power to determine the
necessity is lodged.
No direct evidence available
The discharge of the
witness may only be made if he alone has knowledge of the crime and not when
his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in
the hands of the prosecution.
The
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points
This is an
indispensable requirement because it is a known fact in human nature that a
culprit confessing a crime is likely to put the blame on others rather than
himself.
Said
accused does not appear to be the most guilty.
The law only requires
is that the defendant whose exclusion is requested does not appear to be the
most guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty.
Said
accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Moral turpitude is
defined as anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good
morals. In this requirement prior conviction is necessary, so if the witness
being discharged was merely accused of a crime involving moral turpitude or has
been acquitted of the same, he is still eligible for discharge.
Can the court grant
the discharge before the prosecution has finished presenting all its evidence?
No. The court should
resolve any motion to discharge only after the prosecution has presented all of
its evidence since it is at this time when the court can determine the presence
of the requisites above.
Although Chua v. CA
(p. 703 of Herrera) says that the prosecution is not required to present all
its other evidence before an accused can be discharged. The accused may be
discharged at any time before the defendants have entered upon their defense.
May
more than one accused be discharged as a state witness?
Yes. Rule 119,
Section 17 of the Rules of court does not prohibit the discharge of more than
one co-defendant to be utilized as state witness. It all depends upon the needs
of the fiscal and the discretion of the Judge. Any error of the trial judge in
this manner cannot have the effect of invalidating the testimony of the
discharged co-defendants. (People vs
Bacsa, 104 Phil 136)
What is the remedy of
the prosecution if the court denies the motion to discharge?
The State can file a
petition for certiorari.
What are the effects
of the discharge?
1. Evidence in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion to
discharge, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
2. Discharge of the accused operates as an acquittal and bar to further
prosecution for the same offense,
Exception:
If he fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis of the discharge. In this case, he can be prosecuted again AND
his admission can be used against him.
What happens if the
court improperly or erroneously discharges an accused as state witness (ex. he
has been convicted pala of a crime involving moral turpitude)?
The improper
discharge will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his
competency as a witness. It will also
not invalidate his acquittal because the acquittal becomes ineffective only if
he fails or refuses to testify.
Any error in asking
for and in granting the discharge cannot deprive the discharged of the
acquittal and the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy. [People v.
Verceles (2002)]
What happens when the
original information under which an accused was discharged is later amended?
A discharge under the
original information is just as binding upon the subsequent amended
information, since the amended information is just a continuation of the
original.
Subsequent amendment
of the information does not affect discharge. [People v. Taruc (1962)]
Can the other
conspirators be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
discharged state witness?
No. There must be
other evidence to support his testimony.
The testimony of a state witness comes from a polluted source and must
be received with caution. It should be substantially corroborated in its
material points.
As an exception
however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be
considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains
details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.
Is a motion to discharge fatally inadequate as it failed to allege
all elements of discharge?
No. On
the contention of petitioner that respondent court failed to consider the
motion to discharge as fatally inadequate as it states only three elements of discharge,
viz: (1) that Enriquez is the least guilty; (2) that there is absolute
necessity for his testimony; and (3) that Enriquez has not been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude, petitioner seems to confuse a motion to
discharge to that of an information or complaint. In an information or a
complaint, all the elements necessary to constitute an offense or to state a
cause of action must be alleged and failure to do so will constitute a ground
for the other party to file a motion to quash, in the case of an information,
or a motion to dismiss, in the case of a complaint. The motion to discharge
will suffice if the allegations contained therein adequately inform the adverse
party and the court a quo what relief the movant is praying for. The only
requirement therefor was that a hearing on the motion be had. It is
at the hearing where the movant should show the presence of all the elements
required by the rule for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness.
Can the testimony
come ahead before the discharge?
Yes. “While it is the usual practice of the prosecution to present the
accused who turns state witness only after his discharge, the trial court may
nevertheless sanction his discharge after his testimony if circumstances so
warrant. In the case before Us, the imminent risk to his life justified the
deviation from the normal course of procedure as a measure to protect him while
at the same time ensuring his undaunted cooperation with the prosecution.
Indeed, as is explicit from the Rule, as long as the motion for discharge of an
accused to be utilized as a state witness is filed before the prosecution
rests, the trial court should, if warranted, grant it.” (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 102)
Two
ways of becoming a State witness:
1. under
Section 17 of Rule 119, Rules of Court or
2. under
Republic Act No. 6981 “Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program”
Distinguish Discharge
as a State Witness from Discharge from the Information
Discharge as a State Witness
|
Discharge from the Information
|
Rule 119, Section 7
|
Rule
110, Section 14
|
Accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing trial
|
Accused had not been arraigned
|
Double
jeopardy attaches
|
Double
jeopardy does not attach
|
● Upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case.
● Hearing in support of the
discharge where the prosecution is to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness.
● The court is satisfied of the
5 requisites
|
Can be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor before plea of the accused, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
|
Distinguish Discharge
as a State Witness from Discharge from the Witness Protection Program
Discharge as a State Witness
|
Discharge from the Witness Protection
Program
|
Rule 119, Section 7
|
Republic Act No. 6981
|
Applied before the court
|
Applied before the DOJ
|
Granted
by the court
|
Granted
by the DOJ
|
Compliance with the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17 must
be satisfied
● Upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case.
● Hearing in support of the
discharge where the prosecution is to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness.
● The court is satisfied of the
5 requisites
|
Only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required
● upon motion by the prosecutor
before plea of the accused, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court.
the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the
need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into
play. This is because the determination of who should be criminally charged
in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
|
Double jeopardy attaches because it is a discharge after plea
|
No double jeopardy because it is a discharge before plea
|
Yu vs. Presiding
Judge of RTC Tagaytay
The
discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the
prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and separate from
the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The
discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 is
only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a
state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic
Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.
Rule
119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, contemplates a
situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been
arraigned and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under
this rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the
information to the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.
On the
other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only
compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.
More to
the point is the recent case of Soberano v. People where this Court held:
An
amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the
accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110.
Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the
accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is
sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for
utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other
ground.
At this
level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness
at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of
who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function,
not a judicial one.
G.R.
No. 143093, May 21, 2007
According
to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state
witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought
to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in
the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general
principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact
in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame
on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility.
Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix
will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting
the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution
witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they
could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that
petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.
We
agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To
require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of
Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other
requisite that “there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state
witness.” The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to
consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses. We have ruled that “a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the
statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have
convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only
applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told
the truth in other respects.” It is enough that the testimony of a
co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case
at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of
Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s
testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses, and “to such extent that their trustworthiness
becomes manifest.”
As part
of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The
other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact,
there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder.
The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix
can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
FACTS:
State witness Alfaro admitted that she was with them. She admitted kasama
siyang nagpunta sa bahay ng mga Vizconde. And then she was placed in the
Witness Protection Program and was used against Hubert Webb. And according to
Webb, the provision of the Witness Protection Act – which authorizes the DOJ to
place somebody in the Witness Protection Program, and once he certifies that
she is covered, the fiscal is no longer allowed to file a case against her
(state witness) – is violative of the judicial prerogative to discharge a
witness because you jumping the gun on the court.
According to Webb, it should be the court that will discharge and not the
DOJ. The law is not valid because it is an encroachment of a judicial
prerogative. It is an intrusion for it is only the court which has the power
under the rules on criminal procedure to discharge an accused as state witness.
ISSUE #1: Is Webb’s argument valid?
HELD: “Webb’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In
truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is
the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness
in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.”
ISSUE #2: How do you reconcile this ruling with the rule that only the
court has the power to discharge?
HELD: Simple! In the Witness Protection Program, the accused is NOT even
accused in any case yet. Wala pa! But once he is accused, you need the consent
of the court to discharge, that is kapag kasali na! Pero kung hindi pa kasali,
there is no need for the court’s consent to decide because that is an executive
function.
ISSUE #3: And why is the court’s consent necessary once the accused is
charged in court?
HELD: This is because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. So the SC said, “Section 17 of Rule 119 does not
support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness
is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision the court is given
the power to discharge as state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is
part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent
judicial function.”
ISSUE #4: Is it wise for Congress to enact this law? Why will Congress
enact this kind of law that will determine that the witness will not be
included in the information?
HELD: YES. It is a wise legislation. “Moreover, the Rules of Court have
never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve
the administration of our justice system. The Witness Protection Act is one of
the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight
against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to
testify.”
