Anti-Alias Law Notes

Punishable act under C.A. No. 142 as amended by RA 6085:

Using any name different from the one with which a person was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court.

What are the instances when a second name can be used?

An individual can make use of a second name without infringing upon the law in the following instances:

1. As a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice;

2. When the use of the second name or alias is judicially authorized and duly recorded in the proper local civil registry;

3. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to a single person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth. 

Define alias.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170.  April 10, 1996)

There must be a “sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.” (People vs. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

What is the purpose of the law?

The purpose of the Anti-Alias Law is to prevent confusion and fraud in business transactions. 

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names.  C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the penalty for violation of Anti-Alias Law?

The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.

What is the prescriptive period for Anti-Alias Law?

The prescriptive period for the offense is 8 years. 

Section 1 of Act No. 3326 (as amended by Act 3763) provides: "Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: xxx (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; xxx. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment." 

How should C.A. No. 142 be construed?

C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Will the use of another name in a particular instance constitute use of an alias?

No. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner.  He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner.  There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.  For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.  There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

Cases:

● In the petition for naturalization it was alleged that appellant's full name is Anselmo Lim Hok Albano, alias Lim Hok alias Lim Hok Anselmo Albano. The decisive question to be determined is whether appellant's use of aliases comes within the contemplation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, otherwise known as the Anti-Alias Law. It is noteworthy that this law is not violated if one uses a name with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood. It is a matter of record that the name "Lim Hok" is one by which the appellant has been known since childhood and that, although he was baptized as Anselmo Lim Hok, he has always added "Albano", the surname of his godfather, Dionisio Albano, in connection with his business and social dealings, merely to emphasize his identity. There is no showing that confusion or prejudice ever was or has been caused by the addition of that surname, the effect that Commonwealth Act No. 142 seeks to prevent. We are not thus prepared to hold that the appellant has violated the Anti-Alias Law. (Anselmo Lim Hok Albano vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-10912, October 31, 1958)

● Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law. (Ong Hock Lian vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966)

● The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. According to the provisions of Act 3326 (as amended by Act 3763), covering prescription of offenses punished by special laws, the prescriptive period for the offense charged is eight (8) years. Considering that the Information was filed on March 13, 1984 charging petitioner with violation of the Anti-Alias Law "on or about July 17, 1961, and subsequent thereto", or twenty-three (23) years later to be exact, it is clear that, by prescription, the People has lost the right to prosecute the crime.

The principle cited by the prosecution and sustained by the Appellate Court that the prescription of a continuing offense starts to run from the date of the last illegal use of the unauthorized alias sued upon, is inapplicable to this case. As Judge Bagasao had pointed out in his dismissal Order:

Public records consisting of the accused's petition for naturalization, his marriage contract, his passport dated August 21, 1967, alien certificate of registration No. 3116 dated November 20, 1963, ACR No. 2267733 dated August 4, 1949, Immigration Certificate of Registration (ICR) No. 37922 dated August 4, 1949, show that the accused had already used publicly the name Tahilram J. Balani and the government authorities are deemed to have known the alleged violation.

Where the offense has not been concealed, as when the offense is evidenced by a public record open to inspection, the State will not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused, in order to evade the operation of the Statute of Limitations. (Balani vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69537, June 20, 1986)

● The rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known.  In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.  In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.  The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible.  All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. 

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.  Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.  We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions.  This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly (People vs. Estrada, ibid.).   

read more...

Merritt vs Government

MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916

Facts:

Merritt was riding on a motorcycle towards the western part of Calle Padre Faura at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck Merritt, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. As a result, Merritt was so severely injured. By authority of the United States, Act 2457 was enacted, authorizing the Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable

Held:

Government is not liable. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

● While consent to be sued was granted through a special law, the government was not held liable for damages, because under the attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a special agent.

read more...

City of Caloocan vs Allarde

CITY OF CALOOCAN vs. ALLARDE

G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003

Facts:

In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.

In 1986 the City paid respondent Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries but the City refused to release the money to Santiago.

On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim. The City Government questioned the validity of the auction sale, alleging that the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles of the City.

On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended as payment for respondent Santiago’s claims.  This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.

Thus, on May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal with a warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a manager’s check amounting to P439,378.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.

Held:

Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.

The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law:

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.

The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the “corresponding appropriation as required by law.” The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

read more...

DFA vs NLRC

DFA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996

Facts:

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB.  Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA").  ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi.  

The ADB did not appeal the decision.  Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities.  The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity.  The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.

  

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.  The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.  According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign.  According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.

 “Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.  Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.  The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business.  If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.  If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.  The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community.  When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded.  In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity.  If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.  

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.  But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies.  In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.  In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect.  In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in  behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge.  The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels.  In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case.  When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.  

read more...

Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. VINZON

G.R. No. 154705.  June 26, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.

Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

In turn, respondent filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit based on the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: “Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.” Respondent’s Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Republic of Indonesia is immune from suit

2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities

HELD:

1. Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.  In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.  All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”

The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change.  The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.  This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii.  On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City.

Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis.  Such act is only the start of the inquiry.  Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business?  If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.  If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity.  On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act.  The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity.  Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication.  We find no such waiver in this case.

Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function.  On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State.

We disagree.  There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.  A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep.  Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.  It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, “the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.  In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.” As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor General states that it “was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.

2. No. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State.  He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

x x x

The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision.

read more...

Republic Act No. 10158

 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10158 

AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby, amended to read as follows:

“Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. – For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

“Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period toprision correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.”

SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. – All pending cases under the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. – All persons serving sentence for violation of the provisions of  Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be immediately released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That they are not serving sentence or detained for any other offense or felony.

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 27, 2012

read more...

Municipality of Makati vs CA

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 89898-99. October 1, 1990

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42.

After due hearing, the RTC rendered a decision fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent.

A writ of execution was issued and a Notice of Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner.

Private respondent then filed a motion praying for the court to order the bank to deliver to the sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.

While these motions are pending, however, a “Manifestation” was filed, informing the court that private respondent was no longer the owner of the subject property and that ownership to this has been transferred to Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. A compromise agreement was made between private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank, Inc., which was then approved by the court.

The court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property from the garnished account of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.

The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

While the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner raised for the first time that it had two accounts with PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3), and the other is for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government (Account No. S/A 263-530850-7).

Issue:

WON the balance of the appraised value of the subject property may be levied upon the second account of petitioner municipality, which is earmarked for the municipal government’s other statutory obligations.

Held:

No. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,

. . . just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss [Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291].

The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.

Municipality of Makati was ordered to immediately pay PS Bank and private respondent the amount of P4,953,506.45.

read more...

PNB vs Pabalan

PNB vs PABALAN

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978

Facts:

Private respondent Judge Pabalan rendered a Decision against Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. Accordingly, a writ of execution and a notice of garnishment was issued. Petitioner Philippine National Bank, however, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Pabalan, invoking the doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character.

Issue:

WON the funds of PVTA deposited with the PNB exempt from garnishment

Held:

No. Under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: “The State may not be sued without its consent.” If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. But funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, its funds that are deposited with PNB are not exempt from garnishment. 

read more...