TABASA
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 125793, August 29, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When Petitioner was seven
years old his father became a naturalized citizen of U.S.A. By derivative
naturalization, petitioner also acquired American Citizenship.
In
1995, Petitioner arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a
"balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter the latter was arrested and
detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila,
filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the Petitioner on the
ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued
against him, and that his passport has been revoked.
Petitioner
filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996. At the time Tabasa filed
said petition, he was already 35 years old. While the case was pending, petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau.
ISSUE:
A.
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
B. Whether petitioner because of his
repatriation, has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.
HELD:
A. Petitioner is not qualified
to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171.
The
only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a.
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born
Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner
theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a
natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by
derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
Petitioner
overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino
subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his
children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the
citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a
child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the
capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their
own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization
separately from their parents.
In
the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth.
In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American
citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S.
citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to
automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the
country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner
was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13,
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age
at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither
can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political
or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by
operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was
his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in
deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not
his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a
foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly
to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
Petitioner failed to follow
the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
Even
if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still
he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on
Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated
August 22, 1996.
What
petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he
registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate
of such registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place and
operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel
V. Ramos. Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed
pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a
confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. Thus,
petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the
SCN.
Petitioner failed to prove
that that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity as provided for in the law.
Even
if petitioner––now of legal age––can still apply for repatriation under RA
8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as
provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he
mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for
repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost
his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or
whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such
political or economic necessity should be specified."
Assuming
petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove
to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was
the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for
political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and
thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation
is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State.
This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which
provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications,
procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine
if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an
inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can
reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner
Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting
the petition for repatriation.
B.
No. As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under
RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage of the
law.
Office
Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary
deportation:
2.
The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary
deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is
overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his
passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV
shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and shall
decide the case on the basis thereof.
3.
If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a
valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country,
under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et al.,
G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of
the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of
Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be
immediately executory. 28
In
addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court
held:
It
is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must
possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is
a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to
extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the
alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people"
seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the
privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the
proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. x x x
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