Moy Ya Lim Yao vs CIR

MOY YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-21289, 4 october 1971

Facts:

On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, was permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one month until 13 April 1961 through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. 

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

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In Re: Vicente Ching

IN RE: VICENTE CHING

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

In July 1998, Ching filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. The Supreme Court allowed Ching to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance, Ching submitted PRC Certification, Voter Certification and Certification that he was elected Sanggunian Bayan Member of Tubao, La Union.

Ching passed the bar exams but he was not allowed to take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status. In the Resolution dated 20 April 1999, the Supreme Court required Ching to submit further proof of his citizenship. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was also required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG commented that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625. The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years. In Cuenco case, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time."

Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

Issue:

Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time and if so whether his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.

Held:

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

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Republic vs Li Yao

REPUBLIC vs LI YAO

G.R. No. L-35947, October 20, 1992

Facts:

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949. After hearing, the Court granted the petition and declared Li Yao a naturalized Filipino citizen. Li Yao subsequently took his oath of allegiance.

About fifteen years later, or on January 5, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained.

Relying solely on the ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the government by under-declaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns for the years 1946-1951, the lower court granted the petition and cancelled the Certificate of Naturalization of Li Yao.

Li Yao appealed. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, Li Yao died.

Issues:

Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.

Held:

Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudelently and illegally."

It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment of income tax.

Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned.

In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.

Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and legislation by Congress.

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Coquilla vs Comelec

COQUILLA vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 151914, September 17, 2002, 385 SCRA 607

Facts:

Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.

In1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.

On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the winner.

On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.

2. Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy

3. Whether the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition for certiorari because the motion was pro forma.

Held:

1. Yes. R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.  Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.

2. No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965.  From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

3. It is contended that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma.

The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.

In the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.

The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.

  

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Limkaichong vs Comelec

LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009

Facts:

In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement. Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral argument.

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

Issues:

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case

2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case

3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship

Held:

1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

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Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec

NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under No. 9225, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189) and that the COMELEC accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that “all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,” observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issues: 

1. Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic?

2. WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.

Held: 

1. Yes. The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which however, remains unresolved.

2. Yes. We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:

SEC 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.

SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

  

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non‑resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.

In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL - identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot.

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1)  Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws; xxx

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.  On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:

            

“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;

“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;

 While  perhaps  not  determinative  of  the  issue  tendered  herein, we note  that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.

It  is  very  likely  that   a   considerable   number  of  those  unmarried  children  below  eighteen  (18)  years  of  age  had  never  set foot in the Philippines.  Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

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AASJS vs Datumanong

AASJS vs DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." which was signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 thereof, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.

Issues:

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

Held:

1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

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Lee vs Director of Lands

LEE vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in March 1936, Rafael Dinglasan et al. sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated in Roxas City.

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the CFI Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled against plaintiffs; hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court.  On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

“… granting the sale to be null and void and cannot give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition.  In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto.”

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, filed with the CFI Capiz an action for recovery of the same parcel of land, submitting that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution.  The heirs of Lee Liong filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of Roxas City. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot.

Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, issued a certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong. However, the records of the Register of Deeds were burned during the war.  Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title.

In 1994, the RTC Roxas City ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.

On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case, alleging that the RTC Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

In 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgment of reconstitution void. Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reconstitution based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority is valid.

HELD:

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.

In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during World War II.  All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer certificate of title had not been issued. In the trial court proceedings, petitioners presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latter’s subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner.  Thus, the trial court, after examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong.

However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.  Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain.  However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. “In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.” The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.  This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title.  While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.  Prescription never lies against the State.

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos.  The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos.  In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274.  In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.

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