Republic vs Li Yao

REPUBLIC vs LI YAO

G.R. No. L-35947, October 20, 1992

Facts:

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949. After hearing, the Court granted the petition and declared Li Yao a naturalized Filipino citizen. Li Yao subsequently took his oath of allegiance.

About fifteen years later, or on January 5, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained.

Relying solely on the ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the government by under-declaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns for the years 1946-1951, the lower court granted the petition and cancelled the Certificate of Naturalization of Li Yao.

Li Yao appealed. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, Li Yao died.

Issues:

Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.

Held:

Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudelently and illegally."

It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment of income tax.

Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned.

In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.

Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and legislation by Congress.

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Limkaichong vs Comelec

LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009

Facts:

In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement. Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral argument.

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

Issues:

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case

2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case

3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship

Held:

1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

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Modes of Reacquiring Citizenship

Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. (Sec. 3., Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)

Modes of Reacquiring Citizenship

Commonwealth Act No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,

2. by repatriation, and

3. by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.  As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

But this is now an abbreviated process, with no need to wait for three years (one year for declaration of intent, and two years for the judgment to become executo­ry). An applicant must only possess the following:

            a. at least 21 years of age;

            b. Resident for at least 6 months;

            c. Good moral character;

            d. No disqualification.

Qualifications for naturalization

1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship.

2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization.

3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.

4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject

Disqualifications for naturalization

Section 4 of Act 473 provides the following disqualifications:

1. He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

2. He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

3. He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

4. He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;

5. He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

6. He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;

7. He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

8. He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Repatriation

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. (Bengson III v. House Electoral Tribunal, 07 May 2001)

Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. (see Tabasa  v. Court of Appeals, 29 August 2006)

Effect of repatriation

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.  On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengson v. HRET,  07 May 2001)

Repatriation does not result in the recovery of original/former Philippine domicile

Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.  He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.  Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice.  The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.  (Japzon v. Comelec, 19 January 2009)  

  

Applicable Repatriation Laws

1) Republic Act 9225, “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act”

Available to natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country

2) Republic Act 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos”

Available to Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity.

3) Commonwealth Act 63

Available to persons declared by competent authority to be a deserter of the Philippine army, navy or air corps in time of war, unless subsequently granted a plenary pardon or amnesty.

Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.

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