Sura vs. Martin

The arrest of defendant for failure, owing to insolvency, to pay past and present support was declared invalid.

The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property.

Facts:

CFI of Negros Occidental rendered a decision ordering defendant Vicente S. Martin, Sr. to pay past and future support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision. 

A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated September 21, 1964, stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides."

In 1964, counsel for plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. 

In the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, CFI of Negros Occidental ordered the arrest and imprisonment of defendant Martin. 

Issue: 

Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were legal

Held:

The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerandos:

(1) The writ of execution was a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ.

(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property."

According to Moran:

Generally, any order or judgment of a court finally disposing of an action should be enforced by ordinary execution proceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 39, sec. 9," citing Caluag, et al. vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 320.)

(Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)

read more...

People vs. Linsangan

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.

Facts:

Linsangan was prosecuted for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five days, and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional and void. 

Held:

This case was tried and decided in the court below before the Constitution of the Philippines took effect. But while this appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." This introduces a new element into the case, for while our previous organic law provided that no person should be imprisoned for debt, it contained no express provision against imprisonment for non-payment of a poll or cedula tax.

Turning again to the particular question raised in this case, section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. (People vs. Ambrosio Linsangan, G.R. No. L-43290, December 21, 1935)

read more...