Jose vs. Boyon

In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally possible.  Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for specific performance.

Facts:

In 1998, Sps. Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance in RTC Muntinlupa against Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. The process server went to the residence of Sps. Boyon in Alabang  on July 22, 1998 to try to serve the summons personally. However, he found out that Helen was in the United States and Romeo was in Bicol.  Hence, the process server explained in the Return of Summons that substituted service was resorted to because efforts to serve personally failed. 

Meanwhile, Sps. Jose filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication. The court granted the motion. Sps. Boyon  were declared in default and Sps. Jose was allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On December 7, 1999, the RTC issued a Resolution in favor of Sps. Jose. 

Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Sps. Boyon filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The RTC denied the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 

Sps. Boyon appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the RTC had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue:

Whether or not summons summons were validly served on Sps. Boyon.

Held:

No. 

Defective Personal Summons

In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

“Sec. 6.  Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

“Sec. 7.  Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.  Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return.  The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents (Sps. Boyon).  While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.  It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. 

Summons by publication improper

The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on Sps. Boyon properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. (Sps. Patrick Jose & Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen Boyon & Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369.  October 23, 2003)

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Robinson vs. Miralles

The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

Facts:

On 2000, Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson. The sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security guard, assigned at the gate of the subdivision where Robinson lived, refuse to let the sheriff go inside the subdivision. The security guard alleged that he was instructed by Robinson not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the sheriff's explanation, the guard still refused admittance. The sheriff returned the second time to serve the summons. The same thing happened. So, the sheriff served the summons by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant. 

Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and judgment was rendered ordering her to pay US$20,054.00. A copy of the decision was sent to her by registered mail. On 2003, she filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. She contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

On 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution denying the petition for relief. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the appeal. 

Issue:

Whether or not the summons was properly served.

Held.

Yes. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs. 

In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her. (Remelita Robinson vs. Celita Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006)

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Licaros vs. Licaros

Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Summons by publication and at the same time furnishing respondent with a copy of the Order as well as the corresponding Summons and a copy of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage at her given address in the US thru the Department of Affairs held valid. In actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential provided that the court acquired jurisdiction over the res.

Facts:

Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children left for the United States. On August 6, 1990, Margarita obtained a divorce decree together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo in the Superior Court of California. 

On August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of Properties "followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. On December 27, 1990, a decision was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement.

On June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. Summons were served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. On November 8, 1991, the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was declared null and void.

April 28, 2000, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:

Yes.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effectedunder any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.

The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service (service by publication and furnishing her with a copy of the Order, Summons and a copy of the petition at her address in California thru the Department of Foreign Affairs) does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. (Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs. Abelardo Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003)

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Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Luyaben

Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive.

Facts: 

Warren Embes Luyaben filed a complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta, Inc. (AIMI) in RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides. AIMI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue by invoking the following stipulation in their agreement: ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.

Issue:

Did the stipulation in the Agreement effectively limit the venue of the case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City?

Held:

No. Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive.  In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue, “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. (Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007)

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Brgy. San Roque vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.

Facts:

Petitioner Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents heirs of Francisco Pastor. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that the action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, provides that all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. The Tax Declaration shows that the assessed value of the land involved is only P1,740.00. Hence, it is the MTC which has jurisdiction.  

Issue:

Who has jurisdiction in expropriation cases?

Held:

RTC.

Test to determine whether a suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. 

If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. 

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now RTC). 

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. 

The primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents’ title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." (Brgy. San Roque vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, G.R. No. 138896. June 20, 2000)

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Meliton vs. Court of Appeals

Dismissal thereunder Sec. 2, Rule 17 is without prejudice, except when otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim duly interposed in an Answer and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits thereof.

Facts:

In June 1988, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of land before RTC Naga, Branch 27 against Lydia Meliton on the ground of breach of contract. She alleged that Meliton failed to pay the monthly rentals due, constructed a concrete wall and roof on the leased premises and subleased the property without her consent. 

Meliton filed an answer and set up counterclaims for the recovery of the value of her kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by Ziga. 

In May 2009, Ziga filed a motion to dismiss her complaint alleging that her cause of action had become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The counterclaims of Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. 

In December 1989, Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for the recovery of the amounts involved in her counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.

The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dismissal of the counterclaims in the earlier case is not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure of Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the said dismissal does not constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint. 

The CA reversed the RTC's decision and ordered the dismissal of the case stating that the failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal therefrom rendered the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their counterclaim by another action.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature

2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in another action.

Held:

1. The counterclaims of petitioner are compulsory in nature. 

Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

The "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.

In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present. The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Private respondents's complaint was for rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner's breach of her obligations under the said contract. On the other hand, Petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises, as well as for the filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded.

Both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. That contract of lease pleaded by private respondentconstitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both parties for recovery of their respective claims.

2. Petitioners are not barred by res judicata.

In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 

The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of private respondent, plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court. The order of dismissal of the first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits thereof.

In the order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by reason of the fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the docket fees. The said dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata,  there having been no consideration and adjudication of the case on the merits.

The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims is not res judicata and will not bar the filing of another action based on the same causes of action. (Sps. Lydia and Virgilio Meliton vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101883 December 11, 1992)

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Bautista vs. Maya-Maya Cottages

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final.

Facts:

Plaintiff Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc. (MMCI) filed with the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas a complaint for cancellation of the Spouses Rafael and Ligaya Bautista’s title and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction.

Defendant spouses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action. They averred that MMCI is a private corporation, hence, disqualified under the Constitution from acquiring public alienable lands except by lease.

The trial granted the motion to dismiss.

MMCI filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for quieting of title. 

Spouses Bautista filed their opposition, contending that the amended complaint does not also state a cause of action and if admitted, MMCI’s theory of the case is substantially modified.

The trial court reversed its Order and denied the Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's Order. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting respondent’s amended complaint.

Held:

         

No. Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

         “SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.”

         

The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.   It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule.  Records show that petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint in Civil Case No. 371. What they filed was a motion to dismiss.   It follows that respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final, as in this case.

Verily, the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order admitting the amended complaint, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion.   Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie. (Rafael Bautista vs. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc., G.R. No. 148361,  November 29, 2005)

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Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.  As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties

Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land with damages before RTC Cagayan against Victorino Quinagoran. 

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.  He argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property.  The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

RTC appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that under RA 7691, the jurisdiction falls in the MTC. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved. The complaint does not alleged that the assessed value of the land in question is more than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the assessed value of the property. Respondents, therefore, failed to alleged that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. The tax declaration submitted to the CA likewise shows that the value of the property is only P551.00.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?

2. Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property

Held:

Jurisdiction over accion publiciana

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.  As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

In Atuel v. Valdez  G.R. No. 139561, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517),  the Court likewise expressly stated that: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.  Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.”  However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.

Allegation of the assessed value

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. 

Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.  There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land. 

Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties.  Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.  Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC. (Victorino Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 155179, August 24, 2007)

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