Caoibes vs. Ombudsman

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein.

Facts:

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above.

On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.

On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the administrative case

Held:

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. (Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001)

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Maceda vs. Vasquez

● Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offense committed by judge whether or not offense relates to official duties

● Jurisdiction to investigate offense related to official duties subject to prior administrative action taken against judge by Supreme Court

Facts:

Respondent Napoleon Abiera of Public Attorney’s Office filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner Maceda also falsified his certificates of service in 1989 and 1990.

Maceda filed an ex-parte motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court. The Ombudsman, however, denied the same. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Thus, Maceda filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the Supreme Court.

Maceda contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. He also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Held:

Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offense committed by judge whether or not offense relates to official duties

The office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by a judge even if the charged is unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

Jurisdiction to investigate offense related to official duties subject to prior administrative action taken against judge by Supreme Court

However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Procedure to be observed by ombudsman regarding complaint against judge or other court employee

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination… In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Ombudsman cannot subpoena the Supreme Court and its personnel

The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint. (Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)

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Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

● Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

● Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure.

Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure. 

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit. 

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held: 

1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)

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Pimentel vs. Ermita

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

Facts: 

While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,  issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Petitioners senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued.

They  assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.

Issue:

Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional.

Held:

On the Mootness of the Petition

The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

On the Nature of the Power to Appoint

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:

xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.

On Petitioners’ Standing

The Solicitor General states that petitioners may not claim standing as Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been "infringed upon or violated by the President. If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case."

Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President. Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyo’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary as basis, thus:

To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmeña as members.

Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeña have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.

Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s issuance of appointments to respondents as acting secretaries

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent."

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment

Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. “Law” refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.

Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Ad-interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. (Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005) 

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Jose vs. Boyon

In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally possible.  Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for specific performance.

Facts:

In 1998, Sps. Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance in RTC Muntinlupa against Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. The process server went to the residence of Sps. Boyon in Alabang  on July 22, 1998 to try to serve the summons personally. However, he found out that Helen was in the United States and Romeo was in Bicol.  Hence, the process server explained in the Return of Summons that substituted service was resorted to because efforts to serve personally failed. 

Meanwhile, Sps. Jose filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication. The court granted the motion. Sps. Boyon  were declared in default and Sps. Jose was allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On December 7, 1999, the RTC issued a Resolution in favor of Sps. Jose. 

Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Sps. Boyon filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The RTC denied the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 

Sps. Boyon appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the RTC had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue:

Whether or not summons summons were validly served on Sps. Boyon.

Held:

No. 

Defective Personal Summons

In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

“Sec. 6.  Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

“Sec. 7.  Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.  Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return.  The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents (Sps. Boyon).  While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their whereabouts.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld.  This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.  It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. 

Summons by publication improper

The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on Sps. Boyon properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. (Sps. Patrick Jose & Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen Boyon & Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369.  October 23, 2003)

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Robinson vs. Miralles

The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

Facts:

On 2000, Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson. The sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security guard, assigned at the gate of the subdivision where Robinson lived, refuse to let the sheriff go inside the subdivision. The security guard alleged that he was instructed by Robinson not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the sheriff's explanation, the guard still refused admittance. The sheriff returned the second time to serve the summons. The same thing happened. So, the sheriff served the summons by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant. 

Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and judgment was rendered ordering her to pay US$20,054.00. A copy of the decision was sent to her by registered mail. On 2003, she filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. She contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

On 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution denying the petition for relief. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the appeal. 

Issue:

Whether or not the summons was properly served.

Held.

Yes. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs. 

In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her. (Remelita Robinson vs. Celita Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006)

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Licaros vs. Licaros

Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Summons by publication and at the same time furnishing respondent with a copy of the Order as well as the corresponding Summons and a copy of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage at her given address in the US thru the Department of Affairs held valid. In actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential provided that the court acquired jurisdiction over the res.

Facts:

Abelardo Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros were lawfully married in 1968. Sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate due to marital differences. Margarita together with her two children left for the United States. On August 6, 1990, Margarita obtained a divorce decree together with a distribution of properties between her and Abelardo in the Superior Court of California. 

On August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of Properties "followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. On December 27, 1990, a decision was issued granting the petition and approving the separation of property agreement.

On June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. Summons were served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading. On November 8, 1991, the marriage of Abelardo to Margarita was declared null and void.

April 28, 2000, Margarita received a letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.

Held:

Yes.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effectedunder any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.

The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service (service by publication and furnishing her with a copy of the Order, Summons and a copy of the petition at her address in California thru the Department of Foreign Affairs) does not fall under the first or second mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider sufficient."

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14. (Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs. Abelardo Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003)

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