Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will in 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted 3 marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also died so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death in 1941.

At the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still single. Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves the lots left by Lupo. The lots were subdivided and separate certificate of titles were issued to the respective parties.

Now, the children of Lupo by his third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition, claiming they were co-heirs deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. The other party answered that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.

The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. They Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. Hence, the appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui

2. Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate

Held:

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.

Existence of Marriage

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

Proof of Filiation

Under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. 

Prescription of Action for Partition

Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Repudiation

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names. However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved. (Maria Del Rosario Mariategui, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992)

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Padilla vs. Republic

Facts:

Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co were married in 1954. The union begot 5 children, namely: Michael, Abigail, Rafael, Gabriel, and Annabelle. In 1960, Vincent left the conjugal home and has since never returned or visited his family. Because of his continued absence, Dolores filed a petition declaring Vincent an absentee, which was granted by the court. In 1965, Dolores contracted a second marriage with Edward Padilla. The five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they were his own children. This harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted Dolores Gemora to file the instant petition for change of the minors' surname from "Copuaco" or "Co" to "Padilla", which petition was granted by the lower court. 

Issue:

Whether or not the 5 children should be allowed to use the surname of Padilla

Held:

No. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. Said minors are the legitimate children of Vincent Co; and Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "legitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father."

To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.

The case before us is not of first impression. In Moore vs. Republic, a case involving the same factual melieu, we held that: Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father. Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father, and Article 369 of the same Code provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it is correctly concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father.

If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose which may have animated petitioner, the minor's mother, is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the family of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at present be overlooked or brushed aside. ...

Apart from the legal obstacles discussed above, We consider the instant action taken by petitioner in behalf of her minor children to be premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be left to the judgment and discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit. Petition dismissed. (In the Matter of the Petition for Change of Name. Dolores Gemora Padilla, in representation of her minor children Michael, Abigail, Rafael, Gabriel and Annabelle, all surnamed Copuaco, except the last whose surname is Co vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-28274 April 30, 1982)

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Teresita Llaneta vs. Hon. Corazon J. Agrava

Facts:

Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about 4 years later, Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta was born. Atanacia brought Teresita and Victoriano to Manila where they lived with Serafin’s mother.  

Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  

She filed a petition for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use of the surname Llaneta would cause untold difficulties and confusion. The trial court denied the petition relying on the 3 decisions of the Supreme Court that disallows a change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship.

Issue:

Whether or not the change of surname should allowed

Held:

Yes. Teresita has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.

The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. (Teresita Llaneta vs. Hon. Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054 May 15, 1974)

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Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng

Facts:

Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilar’s parents. Chua  returned to Manila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she did not. 

In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents. 

Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in Manila with him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his parents. 

Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilar’s allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she had experienced some previous in-law troubles. 

Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remit allowance to her in Zamboanga.

His petition was denied, thus this case. 

Issue:

Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua

Held:

The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any support. (G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958)

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Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents. 

Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court  granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. 

In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. 

In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her.

In 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.

Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. 

Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law.  First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.  Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.  Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

Issue:

Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?

Held:

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. 

Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.  Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.  Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”  It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother.  This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.  As explained by the Code Commission:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.  No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.  The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.

For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.  The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. 

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor.  Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.  Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. 

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.  We are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody.  Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. 

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court. (Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906.  February 7, 2002)

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Manuel De Asis vs. Court of Appeals

 Facts:

In 1988, Vircel Andres, as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action for maintenance and support against the alleged father, Manuel De Asis. In his Answer, Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support. Due to said denial, Vircel manifested that it was “futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant.” She, thus, withdrew the complaint subject to the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counterclaim. Manuel agreed and the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against Manuel, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata but was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial.

Issue: 

Whether or not the action for support is barred by res judicata

Held:

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. 

Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:

“No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1)  The civil status of persons;

(2)  The validity of a marriage or legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6)  Future legitime.

The raison d’ etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:

“The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself.  The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

xxx

To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.  This is contrary to public policy.”

The manifestation of Vircel that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from Manuel who denied his paternity over the child amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between Manuel and Vircel for the dismissal of the complaint conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent.  However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence.  It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner’s theory that the dismissal with prejudice of case has the effect of res judicata  on the subsequent case for support. The right to support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise. 

Notwithstanding the dismissal of case and the lower court’s pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper. (Manuel de Asis vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy and Glen Camil Andres De Asis represented by her mother/guardian, Vircel D. Asis, G.R. No. 127578.  February 15, 1999)

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Tijing vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: 

Spouses Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their lost son from Angelita Diamante. They presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Diamante, on the other hand, claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. 

The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Tijing and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. CA expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

Issue: 

Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy

Held: 

Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. (Egardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita Diamante, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001)

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from “Vicencio” to “Yu”. Cynthia alleged that she was born on 19 January 1971 in Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On 10 January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode. Since then,  Pablo Vicencio  never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of her mother. On 15 April 1986, her mother and Ernesto Yu got married. 

Since her childhood, she had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite of which she had been using the family name “Vicencio” in her school and other activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she  had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment. On two (2) occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu. Her step-father had been consulted about the petition and had given his consent thereto.

The trial court granted the petition. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that it is for the best interest of Cynthia that her surname be changed.

Issue:

Whether the change of Cynthia’s surname to that of her step-father’s surname was proper.

Held:

We have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited.  She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her.  Since she is known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment.  

The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondent’s change of surname.  Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondent’s step-father has two (2) children with her mother.  In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a “legitimate” daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor General, opines that “Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’  for which the change is sought.” The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that  legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father.  It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.

Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent’s parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.

Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, the Court ruled that:

“To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother’s second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.”

Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father’s legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood.  However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent’s desire to use  her stepfather’s surname.

Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Cynthia Vicencio, G.R. No. 88202.  December 14, 1998)

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Bonifacia Vancil vs. Helen Belmes

Facts:

Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. 

On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr.  

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. 

Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue: 

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Held:

Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner  Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." (Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 317 [1997])

Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.

Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (242 SCRA 407 (1995), this Court ruled:

"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,   Bonifacia  has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.  Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. (Bonifacia Vancil vs. Helen G. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001).

  

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St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al

Facts:

For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among the students of SMA who took part in the campaign was Sherwin and James. Sherwin and other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by  by James, then 15 years old. On their way to Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle resulting in the death of Sherwin. 

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Vicente and SMA. At the trial, the traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the steering wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator was not disputed by any of the parties. 

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of Dino were found to be only subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school. Dino was absolved for being only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio, the vehicle owner was not held liable at all. 

Issue:

Was the lower court correct? 

Held:

No. 

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. 

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 

In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded. 

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. 

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who should be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. (St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al G.R.143363, February 6,2002).

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