Facts:
In
1988, Vircel Andres, as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed
an action for maintenance and support against the alleged father, Manuel De
Asis. In his Answer, Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and theorized
that he cannot therefore be required to provide support. Due to said denial,
Vircel manifested that it was “futile and a useless exercise to claim
support from defendant.” She, thus, withdrew the complaint subject to the
condition that Manuel will not pursue his counterclaim. Manuel agreed and
the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. However in 1995, Vircel
filed a similar complaint against Manuel, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata
but was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial.
Issue:
Whether
or not the action for support is barred by res judicata
Held:
The
right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a
third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise.
Article
2035, ibid, provides, that:
“No
compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The
civil status of persons;
(2) The
validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3)
Any ground for legal separation
(4)
Future support;
(5)
The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future
legitime.
The raison
d’ etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission
and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:
“The
right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would
mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right
to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced.
xxx
To
allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a
person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the
recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.”
The manifestation of Vircel that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from Manuel who denied his paternity over the child amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into
between Manuel and Vircel for the dismissal of the complaint conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim
is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It
violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
It
is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first
be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Although
in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent,
such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish
the lack of filiation.
Neither
are we persuaded by petitioner’s theory that the dismissal with prejudice of
case has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent
case for support. The right to
support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support
cannot be the subject of compromise.
Notwithstanding
the dismissal of case and the lower court’s pronouncement that
such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still
prosper. (Manuel de Asis vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy and Glen Camil Andres De Asis represented by her mother/guardian, Vircel D. Asis, G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999)