Facts:
For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy
of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive through visitation of other
schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among the
students of SMA who took part in the campaign was Sherwin and James. Sherwin
and other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva and driven by by James, then 15 years old. On their way to Dapitan
City, the jeep turned turtle resulting in the death of Sherwin.
The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his
parents, Vicente and SMA. At the trial, the traffic investigator testified and
submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the steering
wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the
traffic investigator was not disputed by any of the parties.
After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of Dino were found to
be only subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of
insolvency of the school. Dino was absolved for being only a minor under the
special parental authority of the school. Vivencio, the vehicle owner was not
held liable at all.
Issue:
Was the lower court correct?
Held:
No.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
have special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care.
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to
field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under
custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for the school to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right
of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to
show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence
reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded.
Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle
owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the
accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be
held liable since these are events which it had no control. If the school may
be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident. Between
the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
At any rate, since it is clear that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it
is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who should be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. (St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al
G.R.143363, February 6,2002).
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