● While the President is immune from suit, she may
not be prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
● Due process of law does not
require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All
that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
● What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Facts:
Pres. Cory
Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran
argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that
if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for
the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit,
as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends
that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character
of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President;
(2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued
a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President
of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Held:
(1) The allegation of denial
of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact
that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits
before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required
is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates
this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(3) The rationale
for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time,
also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of
immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President
is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is
nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by
the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It
is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court
reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage
to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)
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