Facts:
The
accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
Jalosjos’
primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention
of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos
also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which
states, inter alia, that –
The Court should
never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
Jalosjos
further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail,
for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos
avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of
the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government
to respect his mandate.
Issue:
Whether
or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives
Held:
NO.
The privilege of
arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
True,
election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in
spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by
law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank,
the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
Section
11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:
A Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. xxx
The
immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence
is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
Doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases
The
Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
One
rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction,
is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There
is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.
To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will
virtually make him a free man
When
the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering
from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
In
the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The
Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does
being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The
Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We,
therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class. (
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)
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