DOCTRINE:
Succession in local government
office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from
office.
QUICK
FACTS:
Montebon had been elected for
three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term,
Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy
againas municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against
him based on the three-term limit rule.
FACTS:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and
respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the
Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners
and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for
disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent
had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for
the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues
that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limit rule because
his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due
to the retirement of elected
vice-mayor Petronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be
considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it
was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued
that, according to the law (constitution and LGC), voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned
was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC
First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been
involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek
reelection as municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc
upheld the ruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
respondent's assumption of office
as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal
councilor.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents’
assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be
considered as an effective disruption in his full service of his second term as
councilor.
HELD:
YES. In Lonzanida
v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three consecutive
terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that
the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for
the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been
elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive
terms in the same position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the
concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The
second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that
respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the
issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view
of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government
offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides
that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy
occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded
him in accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor
in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004
term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation
because it was by operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling
of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option
under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the
Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-‐
ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law
speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the
official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law.
Thus, succession by law to a
vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it
involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance
of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges
of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It
is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
● The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption
of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity
of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local
government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his
post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the
higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of
his position as councilor.
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