Wingarts vs Mejia

WINGARTS vs MEJIA

A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012.  March 20, 1995

FACTS:

Col. Munar filed criminal cases for malicious mischief (Crim Case 2663) and grave threats (Crim Case 2664) against Johan Wingarts. Wingarts filed a counter-charge against Col. Munar for usurpation of authority (Crim Case 2696). All three cases were decided by Judge Sevillano Mejia.

Crim Case 2663: Wingarts was acquitted

Crim Case 2664: The charge was dismissed

Crim Case 2696: Acquitted Col Munar 

Relative to the said judgments, Wingarts filed an administrative case against Judge Mejia for malicious delay in the administration of justice in relation to Crim Case 2663, alleging that the case dragged on for a year and four months in the Judges’ sala which was ultimately dismissed.

A second complaint for incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664  and issuing a warrant of arrest against Wingarts despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation.

The third complaint charged the judge for rendering an unjust decision in Crim case 2696, where Capt. Manuel and Col. Munar (military lawyers) appeared in the civil courts without necessary authorization.

ISSUES/HELD: 

1. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664 despite lack of prior barangay conciliation

The court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Court Administrator with regard to finding Judge Mejia liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law but not liable for malicious delay in the administration of justice nor for rendering an unjust 

Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664 despite the legal obstacles thereto. Under Sec 408 (c) of RA 7160 the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding (1) year or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos require a barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art 282 of the RPC falls within the purview of Sec 408. Grave threats is punishable by aresto mayor (1 mo and 1 day to 6 mos) and a fine of not exceeding P500.

It has been repeatedly ruled that the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

Had the Judge taken cognizance of the law Sec 412 of RA 7160 he could have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance of the case and prematurely issuing a warrant of arrest. His actuations however are not tainted with malice or evil intent. The records reveal that he dismissed the case after motion of the defense and recalled the warrant issued. He is therefore ordered to pay the fine of 2,000 with a STERN WARNING.

2. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for malicious delay in administration of justice.

On the charge of malicious delay in administration of justice, the judge cannot be held liable. While there was some delay in the hearing, it does not appear to be malicious or deliberate, the judge should not be subjected to liabilities where delays are brought about by the parties and their lawyers. Litigants should not blame a judge for the delay which was not of his own making. It was found by the Court administrator that it was deemed submitted for decision on May 6, 1994 and was decided barely a month after on June 8, 1994.

3. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for rending an unjust decision

As to the charge of rendering an unjust decision, to hold a judge liable it must be shown that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust, and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust.

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. As interpreted by Spanish Courts, the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.

The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive.

In a recent administrative case decided by this Court, it was reiterated that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 

The complainants dismally failed to convince the court that Judge Mejia knew that his challenged judgment is unjust. He based his decision on a circular of the Dept. of Defense, where Munar was authorized and were able to secure their permit to appear as private prosecutors, moreover according to Mejia a lack of permit does not strip them of their qualifications but merely calls for an administrative sanction. Judge Mejia also took judicial notice that Col Munar was a complainant in Crim Case 2663 and 2664.

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Torralba vs Municipality of Sibagat

FACTS:

Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution:

Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any criteria when the Municipality was created.

The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence.

HELD:

The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.

The power to create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. (Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat, G.R. No. 59180. Jan. 29, 1987 147 SCRA 390)

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Socrates vs Comelec

FACTS:

Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-­term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service    or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512.  November 12, 2002)

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Mendoza vs Comelec

FACTS:

Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:

a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino   

       and served up to 1988

b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992

c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed 

       office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995

d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to1998

e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the 14 May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution

ISSUE:

WON Private Respondent's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the three-­consecutive term limit fixed by law

HELD:

No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-­year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three-­year term before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three-­‐term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-­term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-­year term set by the Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.  Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted.  Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. 

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.  The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.

(Note: Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.)

VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-­‐SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. MENDOZA,   J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that a term during     which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-­‐term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.

PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official's service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters' obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.

AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position.

SANDOVAL-­‐GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA-­‐MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term.

CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-­‐MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman's election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-­term limit imposed by the Constitution. (Mendoza vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512.  November 12, 2002)

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Lonzanida vs Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued.  Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:  1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.  First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. 

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void.  His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation.  It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.  The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.  The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.  Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.  The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.  Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.  The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6.  Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.  If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.  Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150.  July 28, 1999)

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Montebon vs Comelec

DOCTRINE:

Succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.

QUICK FACTS:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy againas municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule.

FACTS:

Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.

On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-­2001, 2001-­2004, and 2004-­2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.

In his answer, respondent argues that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limit rule because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-­mayor due to the retirement of elected vice-­mayor Petronilo Mendoza.

Petitioners maintain that respondent's assumption of office as vice-­mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since   it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law (constitution and LGC), voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected.

On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-­mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.

On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-­2004 term as municipal councilor.

ISSUE:

WON the private respondents’ assumption of the vice-­mayor office, by virtue of succession, can be considered as an effective disruption in his full service of his second term as councilor.

HELD:

YES.  In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the    same local government post; and 2) that he has FULLY served three consecutive terms.

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.

Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.  Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-­mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-­2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.

We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –­

 The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-­‐ ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-­performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444.  April 9, 2008)

● The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor. 

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Borja vs Comelec

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr., was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998.

On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term.

The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Borja and declared Capco disqualified but the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor.

Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-­mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

● The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.

To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495.  September 3, 1998)

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Rivera vs Comelec

FACTS:

The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales.

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.  Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160. 

Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-­graft case from January to July 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Morales violated the three-­‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in the 2004 elections.

HELD:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-­term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. (Rivera vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)

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Dizon vs Comelec

FACTS:

Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-­term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-­term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly-­elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term.

ISSUES:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-­2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-­2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

HELD:

1.  NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4^th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998

1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001

1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and

1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

● Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:

“The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioner’s incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court’s decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.” (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

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