VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA
G.R. No.
L-61311, September 2l, 1987
FACTS:
In 1961, the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United
Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the
subject property within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was
protested and Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the construction of stalls.
While the case was pending, the municipal
council adopted Resolution No. 29 which declared the subject area as a parking
place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No.
2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature and was beyond the
commerce of man. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.
The decision was apparently not enforced, for
the petitioners were not evicted from the place. They were assigned specific
areas and were made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of
the area.
On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after
CFI decision), the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29,
to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a
public plaza.
After
investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino, officer‐in-charge of the office of the mayor, issued
a resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the subject area.
Petitioners
filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.
Hence, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that they had
right to occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the
municipal government, and later, by virtue of space allocations made in their
favor for which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered
into said agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same
could be terminated at will because rent was collected daily.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendors had the
right to occupy and make use of the property.
HELD:
No. A public
plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or
any other contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town
plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are outside the common of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
Applying
this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the
first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining
there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
Since the
occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of
the community. Stalls, being made of flammable materials, became a potential
fire trap; access to and from the market was obstructed; there were aggravated
health and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in
the public market were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the people
were deprived of the use of the place as a public plaza.
The
problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered
by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general
welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by
law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised
in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the
municipal council of San Fernando.
Even
assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police
power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.
In fact, every contract affecting the public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely,
for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will
not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by
the paramount police power.
The CFI
judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
prohibition. Petition dismissed.
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