Tatel vs Municipality of Virac

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

G.R. No. 40243, 11 Mar 1992, 207 SCRA 157

Facts: 

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse.

A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.

Tatel filed a petition for preliminary injunction to prevent council from implement such a resolution.

Respondent municipal officials contended that petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 is unconstitutional and void.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is discriminatory in that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted

The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

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Technology Developers vs Court of Appeals

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:

Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-­Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-­Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-­Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayor’s permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until the case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology Developer

HELD:

YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

1.  No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2.  The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3.  This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4.  The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report  observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

5.  Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6.  While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

● The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petition denied.

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Villanueva vs. Castaneda

VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. L-61311, September 2l, 1987

FACTS:

In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the subject property within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of stalls.

While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29 which declared the subject area as a parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place. They were assigned specific areas and were made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of the area.

On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.

After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino, officer­‐in-­charge of the office of the mayor, issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the subject area.

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.

Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the municipal government, and later, by virtue of space allocations made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered into said agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at will because rent was collected daily.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property.

HELD:

No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.

Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of the community. Stalls, being made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap; access to and from the market was obstructed; there were aggravated health and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in the public market were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the people were deprived of the use of the place as a public plaza.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.  In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

The CFI judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. Petition dismissed.

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White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

FACTS:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.”

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.

On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.

On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.

The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes.

For an ordinance to be a legitimate exercise of police power,

(1) It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.

(2) It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.

(3) A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.  As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’” Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.  These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well­intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.

● The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.

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Chua Huat vs CA

FACTS:

Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel del Rosario to condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners.  The said official issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based on Inspection Reports showing that the buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor confirmed the condemnation orders.

More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound.

Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order.  The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.

The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official;

(2) WON the City Mayor and City Engineer committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of such powers.

HELD:

(1) YES. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials.  The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings.  Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

(2) NO. The orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was shown that all the buildings had architectural, structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law. Petitioners were given the opportunity to protest the condemnation but only did so long after the lapse of the period (7 days) allowed them under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. 

It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." (Chua Huat vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53851, July 9, 1991)

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Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

In 1980, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which forbade the transportation and slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught by the police. His carabaos were immediately confiscated. He filed a case for replevin before the RTC. The carabaos were returned to him upon filing of a superseades bond of P12,000.00. After hearing, the court  sustained the confiscation. Since Ynot could no longer produced the carabaos, the superseades bond was ordered confiscated. Ynot appealed to the IAC which upheld the decision of the RTC. Ynot appealed to the SC with the following contentions:

1. EO 626-A is unconstitutional as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries
2. Penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court guaranteed by due process
3. The measure should not have been presumed and so sustained, as constitutional
4. There is an improper exercise of legislative power

Issue:

Was Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional?

Held:

Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. (G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)

POLICE POWER

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

DUE PROCESS

The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution

ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers

Quotable Quotes

• The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!"

• The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

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