Facts:
In 1980, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which forbade the transportation and slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught by the police. His carabaos were immediately confiscated. He filed a case for replevin before the RTC. The carabaos were returned to him upon filing of a superseades bond of P12,000.00. After hearing, the court sustained the confiscation. Since Ynot could no longer produced the carabaos, the superseades bond was ordered confiscated. Ynot appealed to the IAC which upheld the decision of the RTC. Ynot appealed to the SC with the following contentions:
- EO 626-A is unconstitutional as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries
- Penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court guaranteed by due process
- The measure should not have been presumed and so sustained, as constitutional
- There is an improper exercise of legislative power
Issue:
Was Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional?
Held:
Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. (G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987)
POLICE
POWER
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
But
while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No.
626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do
not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals
for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant dead meat.
DUE
PROCESS
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement
for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases
accepted, however. there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of
the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of
the need to correct it.
In the
case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution
ENCROACHMENT
OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
INVALID
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the
case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is
an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer,
they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short,
a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers
Quotable
Quotes
• The
essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!"
• The
strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage
of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are
but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish
and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become
truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert
them.
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