REYES
vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996
FACTS:
Dr. Manalo filed with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against incumbent Mayor
Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and
collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public
Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation
and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal
Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that
he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered
his removal from office.
Reyes filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later,
the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes
to vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent
vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the order.
Thereafter, Reyes filed a
certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification
was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of
candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of
the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected
mayor.
The COMELEC en banc declared him
to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his
proclamation as municipal mayor. Hence
the petition in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the
administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory
and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the
ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election
on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest
number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc
denied Garcia’s prayer.
ISSUES:
1. WON the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy
thereof.
2. WON petitioner’s reelection
rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic
3. WON the candidate who obtains
the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. The failure of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the
refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated
attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by
registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or
decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service
is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would
be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it.
Reyes’s refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a
waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient
notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received
the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance
with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the
decision became final 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus,
when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had
already become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari
with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining
finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does
not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the
reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the
course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari
proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued
expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to
the service of the decision upon petitioner.
2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo
v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed
for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated
as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before
the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing
petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct
was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the
alleged misconduct was committed. If
a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no
longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the
two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very
opposite of those cases. Here, although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he
brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and
it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to
appeal to the Office of the President.
He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40 (b)
of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for
reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time
the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to § 40 (b)
which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the
ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
Indeed, it appears that
petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant
would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he
had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he
employed to render the case against him moot by his election.
3. The candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The
votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes
was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact
to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
● Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the
Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments either personally
or by mail. Personal service is completed
upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy
personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a
person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.
Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioner’s
counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also
made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not
claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to
him on March 27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not
delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed
and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it
can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not
for his or his counsel’s refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioner’s counsel
knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in
his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to
have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for
certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the
decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of
the decision.
The purpose of the rules on
service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or
judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his
interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other
appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
In practice, service means the
delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to
the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to
its legal effect.
In the case at bar, petitioner
was given sufficient notice of the decision.
Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have
received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160, § 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on
April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
