Physician-Patient Privilege

A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient [Rule 130, Sec. 24(c)]

Requisites:

1. Physician is authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics

2. Information was acquired or the advice or treatment was given by him in his professional capacity for the purpose of treating or curing the patient

3. Information, advice or treatment, if revealed, would blacken the reputation of the patient

4. Privilege is invoked in a civil case, whether the patient is a party thereto or not

Does not apply where:

1. Communication not given in confidence

2. Communication is irrelevant to the professional employment

3. Communication was made for an unlawful purpose, as when it is intended for the commission or concealment of a crime;

4. Information was intended to be made public

5. There was a waiver of the privilege either by provisions of contract or law.

Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cross-reference Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4

The results of the physical and mental examination of a person, when ordered by the court, are intended to be made public; hence they can be divulged in that proceeding and cannot be objected to on the ground of privilege. Also results of autopsies or post-mortem examinations are generally intended to be divulged in court, aside from the fact that the doctor’s services were not for purposes of medical treatment.

If the party examined obtains a report on said examination or takes the deposition of the examiner, he thereby waives any privilege regarding any other examination of said physical or mental condition conducted or to be conducted on him by any other physician.

● Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered by the privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives and other people who attend to the ill can be called to testify as to any matter.

● Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.

● Not necessary that the relationship was created by the voluntary act of the patient – may have been acquired by another. (e.g. patient in extremis)

● Privilege extends to all forms of communication, advice or treatment. Includes information acquired by the physician through his observations and examinations of the patient.

● The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not testify to matters specifically referring to the patient.

● There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.

de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?

● A patient’s husband is not prohibited from testifying on a report prepared by his wife’s psychiatrist since he is not the treating physician (although it would be hearsay).

● A physician is not prohibited from giving expert testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical or mental condition of a patient he has treated professionally. 

Cases

Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting physician to give expert testimony regarding hypothetical facts.

Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Non-physician testimony on a medical psychologist’s report is not covered by the physician patient privilege. This is hearsay but there was no objection.

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Priest-Penitent Privilege

A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs. (Rule 130, Sec. 24 (d)

Requisites

a. Confession was made or advice given by the priest in his professional character in the course of the discipline enjoined by the church to which the priest or minister belongs;

b. The confession must be confidential and penitent in character.

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Public Officer’s Privilege

State Secret

A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (Rule 130, Sec. 24 (e)

Requisites:

1.  It was made to the public officer in official confidence

2.  Public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the communication (as in the case of State’s secrets)

Where no public interest would be prejudiced, the rule does not apply. (Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, G.R. No. 70054, July 8, 1986)

• Newsman’s Privilege

Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State. (RA 53, as amended by RA 1477)

Requisites of newsman’s privilege:

1. publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter

2. of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation

3. cannot be compelled to reveal

4. as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication

5. related in confidence

Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.

• Article 233 of Labor Code

All information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communications and shall not be used as evidence in the NLRC, and the conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding the matter taken up at the conciliation proceedings conducted by them.

• Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (RA 9285)

Sec 9 (a) – Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.

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Parental and filial privilege

Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege.—No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

Who may not be compelled to testify?

1. Person against his parents or other direct ascendants (FILIAL PRIVILEGE)

2. Person against his children or other direct descendants (PARENTAL PRIVILEGE)

Rationale of the rule

To preserve the harmonious relations between parent and child which could ruptured through testifying in court. Furthermore, perjury may result because the parent or the child may give false testimony to protect the other. 

Testimonial privilege not a testimonial disqualification

Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial disqualification (§22-24 of Rule 130). Here, the witness is the holder of the privilege and has the power to invoke or waive the privilege. He cannot be compelled but he is not prohibited to testify. The relative against whom he is testifying cannot invoke nor waive the privilege. 

Can a parent testify against a child or a descendant?

Yes. But he cannot be compelled.

Can a child testify against his parent or ascendant?

Yes. But he cannot be compelled.

Instance when a child can be compelled to testify 

"No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other". (Art. 215 Family Code) 

Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal case where:

1. the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or

2. the descendant-witness’s parent commits a crime against the descendant-witness’s other parent.

and the testimony of the descendant is indispensable. In such cases, the descendant can be required to testify.

Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if it is a crime by the descendant against the ascendant-witness. The ascendant-witness may testify voluntarily though.

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Admissions of a party

Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. 

What is an admission?

● An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Sec. 26, Rule 130, Rules of Court). 

● It is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claims in an action (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5^th Ed., 44).

● It is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him (31 C.J.S. 1022)

Requisites for admissibility

To be admissible, an admission must:

a. Involves a matter of fact, not of law

b. Categorical and definite

c. Knowingly and voluntarily made

d. Adverse to the admitter's interest, otherwise, self-serving and inadmissible as hearsay

What is a self-serving declaration?

Self-serving declaration is one which has been made extrajudicially by the party to favor his interests. It is not admissible in evidence. It does not include his testimony in court. Cannot be considered self-serving if it was not made in anticipation of a future litigation.

Judicial admission – admissions made in the judicial proceeding under consideration.

a. Formal judicial admission – those made in writing such as in pleadings, motions, stipulations of facts.

b. Informal judicial admission – those made orally in the course of

 - the testimony of a party or

 - his witness or in depositions or affidavits or

 - statements of counsel

Extrajudicial admission – admissions made out of court or in a judicial proceeding other than the one in consideration

a. Express extrajudicial admission – those made in definite, certain and unequivocal manner

b. Implied extrajudicial admission – those which may be inferred from the act, conduct, declaration, silence or omission of a party.

            Examples:

1. Laches

2. Flight from justice

3. Evidence of attempts to suppress evidence

4. Efforts of an accused to have the case dropped through the help of relatives and various influential people

What is a confession?

A confession is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein (Sec. 33, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Tracy’s Handbook, 62 Ed., 242). It is a statement by the accused that he engaged in conduct which constitutes a crime (29A Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 708).

Admission vs. confession

● An admission in a general sense includes confessions, the former being a broader term because accordingly, a confession is also an “admission . . . by the accused of the fact charged against him or of some fact essential to the charge” (4 Wigmore, Sec. 1050). A confession is a specific type of admission which refers only to an acknowledgment of guilt. As used, the term admission refers to acknowledgment of facts which although may be incriminating falls short of an admission of guilt.

● An admission may be implied like an admission by silence; a confession cannot be implied. It should be a direct and positive acknowledgment of guilt.

1. An admission is a statement of fact which does not involve and acknowledgement of guilt or liability as is the case of a confession.

2. An admission may be express or tacit while a confession must be express.

3. Admissions may be made by third persons and, while confessions can be made only by the party himself and, in some instances, are admissible against his co-accused.

Effects of admissions

An admission by a party may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 26, Rule 132, Rules of Court). His admission is not admissible in his favor, because it would be self-serving evidence. Declarations of a party favorable to himself are not admissible as proof of the facts asserted (Cole v. Ralph, 252 US 286, 64 L Ed 567, 40 SC Ct 312, USTC 312a, 3 AFTR 3051; State v. Warren, 242 Iowa 1176, 47 NW2d 221; Jones v. Dugan, 124 Md. 346, 350, 92 A. 775).

An example considered as an admission by the Supreme Court are the following alleged statements of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada as contained in the so-called Angara Diary: (a) his proposal for a snap election in which he would not participate; (b) his statement that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday; and (c) statements like: Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to clear my name, then I will go” (Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108). These words were taken by the Court as an admission of his resignation.

Admissions that are admissible against a party

1. Admissions against interest

2. Compromises

3. Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta

a. Partner’s/Agent’s admissions

b. Co-conspirator’s statements

c.    Admission by Privies

4. Admissions by silence 

Classification of admission and confessions

1.  An admission may be express or implied. An express admission is a positive statement or act. An implied admission is one which may be inferred from the declarations or acts of a person. A confession cannot be implied. It must be a positive acknowledgment of guilt and cannot be inferred. Sec. 33 of Rule 130 refers to a confession as a “declaration” which connotes an affirmative statement from the person making the confession.

2.   An admission may be judicial or extrajudicial. An admission is judicial when made in the course of a judicial proceeding. An admission is extrajudicial when made out of court or even in a proceeding other than the one under consideration (Perry v. Simpson, Conn. 313). A confession may be also judicial or extra judicial for the same reasons (29A Am Jur 2d §711).

3.  An admission may also be adoptive. This admission occurs when a person manifests his assent to the statements of another person. The admission may be received in evidence if it can be shown that a party adopted the statements as his own (Fed. Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(B); Black’s, 5^th Ed., 44).

The statements of President Estrada as written in the Angara Diary were deemed by the Court as adoptive admissions. To rebut the argument that the diary is not the diary of the former president and thus, could not be admissible against him, the Court declared: “. . . The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person . . .” (Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108).

Admission distinguished from declarations against interest

An admission is oftentimes confused with a declaration against interest. They are however distinct from each other.

(a) To be admitted as a declaration against interest, the declarant must be dead or unable to testify; an admission is admissible even if the person making the admission is alive and is in court.

(b) A declaration against interest is made before the controversy arises; an admission is made at any time, even during the trial.

(c) A declaration against interest is made against one’s pecuniary or moral interest; an admission is admissible as long as it is inconsistent with his present claim or defense and need not be against one’s pecuniary or moral interest.

(d) A declaration against interest is admissible even against third persons; and admissions are admissible only against the party making the admission.

(e) A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule; an admission is not and is admissible not as an exception to any rule.

Cases

People vs. Aling (1980) – The testimony of the accused in a parricide case to the effect that he was married to the victim is an admission against his penal interest and can sustain his conviction even in the absence of independent evidence to prove such marriage.

Facts: Norija Mohamad was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm and she died two days later in the hospital. Girlie Aling and Norija’s daughter Daria brought Norija to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband Airol Aling. Aling was investigated by the police and he declared in Chavacano dialect that he killed his wife because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was fooling around with other men. Aling was charged with parricide and during arraignment, he pleaded guilty although he had no lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for him. When he was again arraigned, he pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Aling was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel and after being informed that the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, Aling still admitted killing his wife.

Issue: WON the marriage of Aling and Norija was proven

Held: Yes. The testimony of Aling that he was married to Norija is an admission against his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim simper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves to be husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

People vs. Bocasas (1985) - Flight from justice is an admission by conduct and circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.

Keller & Co. v. COB – president’s admission binds corporation 

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Offer of compromise not admissible

Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.

Offer of compromise in civil cases

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not an admission against the offeror.

Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not admissible only as evidence of liability. If the offer of compromise is offered as evidence on other matters (e.g. amount of liability), then the evidence is admissible.

Offer of compromise in criminal cases

1.  An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. However, the accused may be permitted to prove that such offer was not made under consciousness of guilt but to avoid the risks of criminal actions against him (US vs. Maqui, 27 Phil 97).

Example: Although the marriage of the accused in a rape case extinguishes the penal action (Art. 344, RPC, Alonto vs. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245), an offer of marriage is, generally speaking, an admission of guilt (People vs. Bulos, G.R. No. 123542, June 26, 2001).

2. There is no implied admission of guilt if the offer of compromise is in relation to

(a) quasi-offenses (criminal negligence); or

(b) in those cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases. Sec. 204 RA 8424)

Plea of guilty later withdrawn

A plea of guilty later withdrawn, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea.

An unaccepted plea of guilty to a lesser offense

An unaccepted plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. (Cross-reference: Rule 116, Sec. 1(f), Rule 118, Secs. 1 and 2)

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injured party. Such humanitarian acts or charitable responses should be encouraged and rewarded, instead of being discouraged or penalized.

 

Cases

Veradero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 (1924) – evidence on an offer to compromise is admissible even in civil cases if it is to prove amount of a liability and not the liability itself.

US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (1916) – offer of compromise in criminal cases inadmissible when accused shows that it was made not under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason; in this case, the law allowed compromise, thus the offer to compromise is not admitted.

People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) – offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the actions of such person by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence of such offer as an error.

People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (1996) – the offer to compromise made by a person other than the accused was admitted in evidence because the accused failed to repudiate such acts by raising the trial court’s admission of evidence on such offer as an error.

People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (1997) – whether a complaint has been filed or not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer to compromise. 

People vs. Amiscua (1971) - In a rape case, an offer to compromise for a monetary consideration, and not to marry the victim, is an implied admission of guilt.

People vs. Valdez (1987) - An offer of marriage by the accused during the investigation of the rape case is also an admission of guilt.

People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (1914)

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Res Inter Alios Acta Rule

Sec. 28. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. 

Res inter alios acta

The expression if fully expressed reads: res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet which literally means that “things done to strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties to them” (Black’s, 5^th Ed., 1178).

Branches

The res inter alios acta rule has two branches, namely:

(a) The rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission or another (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

(b)  The rule that evidence of previous conduct or similar acts at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same act at another time (Sec. 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court).

● The first branch is a very simple and logical rule which holds that whatever one says or does or omits to do should only affect him but should not affect or prejudice others. In other words, both common reason and fairness demand that a man’s actions and declarations should affect him alone and should not affect others. Thus, if X makes a statement before the media admitting his participation in a previous murder, his statement is admissible against him under Sec. 26 of Rule 130. The rest of his statement pointing to Y and Z as co-participants in the murder are not admissible against Y and Z under the first branch of the res inter alios acta rule in Sec. 28 of Rule 130. Under this rule, the statement of X should not affect or prejudice Y and Z.

Rule refers to extrajudicial declaration

The rule has reference to extrajudicial declarations. Hence, statements made in open court by a witness implicating persons aside from his own judicial admissions, are admissible as declarations from one who has personal knowledge of the facts testified to.

Exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule

The first branch of the rule admits of certain exception, to wit: 

  (a)  admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29, Rule 130);

  (b)  admission by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule 130; and

  (c)  admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130).

● Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationship be proven by evidence independent of the act or declaration sought to be admitted.

Basis

The basis for admitting the above admissions is that the person making the statements is under the same circumstances as the person against whom it is offered. Such circumstances give him substantially the same interest and the same motive to make a statement about certain matters (4 Wigmore Sec. 1080a, 140).

Cases

People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)

Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-judicial confession of another admitting his participation in the offense. Held: This is not a co-conspirator’s statement because there was no evidence of conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the confession was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended.

Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-accused, the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was presented was a merely his affidavit.

People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) – absent independent evidence of conspiracy, extra-judicial confession of the accused is not admissible against others

People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996) – extra-judicial confession of accused can not be used to implicate co-accused unless repeated in open court.

People vs. Valero (1982)

Facts: Michael and Annabel, children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning after eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. Their sister Imelda would have also died if not for the timely medical assistance given to her. At about the same time, 3 puppies of Velasco under the balcony where the children ate the bread also died of poisoning. Earlier that morning, Velasco was seen throwing poisoned rats in the river near his house.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, deaf-mute brother of accused Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila who gave Alfonso the bread to be delivered to the children. Lucila denies the allegation. The evidence of the defense tends to show that the children might have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning the rats.

3/9 witnesses for the prosecution:

1.   Rodolfo Quilang – testified that he saw Lucila deliver something wrapped in a piece of paper to Alfonso and instructed him by sign language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. He never saw what was inside the piece of paper. His testimony as to WON he saw the parcel delivered to the children was a series of contradictions. He is what the defense counsel calls and “eleventh-hour witness

2.   Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco – did not see Lucila deliver to Alfonso the alleged parcel, as well as the alleged instruction. Both claimed that they learned the information from Pipe after interviewing him by means of sign language. Testimony of Jaime was confusing. There is nothing in the testimony of Velasco indicating that Alfonso pointed to Lucila as the source of the poisoned bread.

Issue: WON the testimonies of Jaime and Velasco may be admitted

Held: No. The evidence is pure hearsay. It violates the principle of res inter alios acta. Alfonso, who was the source of the information, was never presented as a witness either for the defense or the prosecution. Testimony of Velasco cannot be considered as part of res gestae because when the information was allegedly obtained by Velasco from Alfonso, nobody was poisoned yet. With regard to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that the revelation was made by Alfonso under the influence of a startling occurrence.

The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence does not give such evidence probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value

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Admission by co-partner or agent

Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. – The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. 

Agency

An agent performs some service in representation or on behalf of his principal (Art. 1868, Civil Code of the Philippines). The agent therefore, is in legal contemplation, a mere extension of the personality of the principal and unless the agent acts in his own name, the principal must comply with all the obligations which the agent may have contracted within the scope of his authority (Art. 1883; Art. 1910, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, whatever is said by an agent to a third person, during the course of the agency and within the scope of his actual or apparent authority, relative to the business contemplated by the agency, is for legal purposes also the statement of the principal and is therefore, admissible against said principal (29A Am Jur 29 Evidence § 815 citing Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 US 229, 62 L Ed 260, 38 S Ct 65).

Partnership

The relationship among partners is on the same footing with the relationship of an agent to his principal. Both the contracts of agency and partnership involve fiduciary relationships. Under the law (Art. 1818, Civil Code of the Philippines), every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business and the act of the partner in carrying out the usual course of business binds the partnership as a rule. Hence, under the same principle governing an agency, the declarations of a partner may be admissible against the other partners or the partnership.

Requisites for admissibility

Not every declaration or act made or done by a partner or agent is admissible against the other partners or the principal. For the admission of a co-partners or agent to be admissible, the following requisites must concur:

(a) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have been made or done within the scope of his authority;

(b) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have been made or done during the existence of the partnership or agency, and the person making the declaration is still a partner or an agent; and

(c) The existence of the partnership or agency is proven by evidence other than the declaration or act of the partner and agent.

● Any declaration made before the partnership or agency existed or those made after are not admissible against the other partners or the principal but remains admissible against the partner or agent making the declaration. It is also necessary for the application of the exception that the proof of the agency or partnership be from a source independent of the declaration made by the partner or agent.

● As a rule, statements made after a partnership has been dissolved does not fall within this exception, but where the admission are made in connection with the winding up of the partnership affairs, said admissions are still admissible as the partner is acting as an agent of his co-partners in winding up. (Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 2004 ed., p. 720) 

Rule also applies to

The above rules apply to the declarations or acts of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other persons jointly interested with the party (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).

Cases

Jaucian vs. Querol, 88 Phil 707. The phrase joint debtor does not refer to a mere community of interest but should be understood according to its meaning in the common law system from which the provision was taken, that is, in solidum, and not mancomunada.

Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909) Discharge of a debt given by a managing partner, 2 years after the partnership had been dissolved does not qualify as a partner’s admission and can not prejudice or bind the other partners.

Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)

Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to recover his share in the partnership. Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his co-partner, are not competent to prove the existence of a partnership, between them as against such other partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be established by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.

Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198) – the jurisdiction in which this case is decided has a law which explicitly declared that an act of a party or his agent is not hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of his statement as long as it is within the scope of his authority, may be used against him and his principal 

Note:

Word omission in Section 28 doesn't appear here. Because if it was, can become vague (same as with Section 30)

It only appears in Section 31: admission by privies

What predecessors didn't do is binding on you = this is the rationale in including the word omission in Section 31

GR: admission of someone else shouldn't be taken against you. But Section 29 is an exception: admission of another can be taken against you – fair?

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Admission by Conspirator

Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. 

When does conspiracy exists?

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Art. 8, RPC). Once conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all. The statement therefore of one may be admitted against the other co-conspirators as an exception to the rule of res inter alios acta.

Requisites for admissibility

For the exception to apply, the following requisites must concur:

(a) The declaration or act be made or done during the existence of the conspiracy;

(b) The declaration or act must relate to the conspiracy; and

(c) The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the declaration or act.

Cases

People vs. Serrano

This rule applies only to extrajudicial acts or statements and not to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the party adversely affected thereby has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

An admission by a conspirator is admissible against his co-conspirator if:

1.     Such conspiracy is shown by evidence aliunde

2.     Admission was made during the existence of the conspiracy

3.     Admission relates to the conspiracy itself

These are not required in admissions during the trial as the co-accused can examine the declarant.

•  Judicial admissions - admissions after the conspiracy has ended

•  Existence of conspiracy may be inferred from

1.     Acts of the accused

2.     Confessions of the accused

3.     By prima facie proof thereof

People vs. Alegre (1976)

Where there is no independent evidence of the alleged conspiracy, the extrajudicial confession of an accused cannot be used against his co-accused as the res inter alios rule applies to both extrajudicial confessions and admissions

•  Extrajudicial admission made by a conspirator after the conspiracy has ended and even before trial – not admissible against co-conspirator

Except:

1. If made in the presence of the co-conspirator who expressly or impliedly (tacit admission, Rule 130.32) agreed therein

2. Where the facts stated in the said admissions are confirmed in the individual extrajudicial confessions made by the co-conspirators after their apprehension

3. As a circumstance to determine the credibility of a witness

4. As circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator’s participation in the offense

People vs. Ola (1987)

In order that the extrajudicial statements of a co-accused may be taken into consideration in judging the testimony of a witness, it is necessary that the statements are made by several accused, the same are in all material respects identical, and there could have been no collusion among said co-accused in making such statements.

People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)

Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial confession of his co-accused.

Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy, hence it was inadmissible.

People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955) – confession regarding conspiracy may be used against confessor (multiple admissibility); confession regarding conspiracy should be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is proved; statements must be made during the conpiracy and in furtherance of its object to be admissible.

People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968) – conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession; reiterated “in furtherance”

People v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (1959) – requirement that conspiracy must be shown 1^st other than confession applies only to extra-judicial confessions not to testimony in open court.

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