Lee vs Director of Lands

LEE vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in March 1936, Rafael Dinglasan et al. sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated in Roxas City.

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the CFI Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled against plaintiffs; hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court.  On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

“… granting the sale to be null and void and cannot give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition.  In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto.”

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, filed with the CFI Capiz an action for recovery of the same parcel of land, submitting that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution.  The heirs of Lee Liong filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of Deeds of Roxas City. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot.

Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz, issued a certification that a transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong. However, the records of the Register of Deeds were burned during the war.  Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of title.

In 1994, the RTC Roxas City ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.

On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in Reconstitution Case, alleging that the RTC Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

In 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgment of reconstitution void. Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Court of Appeals denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reconstitution based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority is valid.

HELD:

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.

In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during World War II.  All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer certificate of title had not been issued. In the trial court proceedings, petitioners presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the latter’s subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner.  Thus, the trial court, after examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong.

However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.  Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain.  However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. “In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.” The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General.  This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title.  While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.  Prescription never lies against the State.

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos.  The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos.  In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.” Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274.  In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.

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Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will in 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted 3 marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also died so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death in 1941.

At the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still single. Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves the lots left by Lupo. The lots were subdivided and separate certificate of titles were issued to the respective parties.

Now, the children of Lupo by his third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition, claiming they were co-heirs deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. The other party answered that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.

The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. They Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. Hence, the appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui

2. Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate

Held:

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.

Existence of Marriage

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

Proof of Filiation

Under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. 

Prescription of Action for Partition

Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Repudiation

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names. However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved. (Maria Del Rosario Mariategui, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992)

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