Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan

ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court, seeking to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also prayed that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary investigations with the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Does the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecuter) have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan?

Held:

No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or commission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 13, par. 1)

The Constitution likewise provides that:

The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, contempt except those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7).

Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority.

Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.

It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as he has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are Identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and function of the Ombudsman.

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Orap vs. Sandiganbayan

ORAP VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. L-50508-11,  October 11, 1985

Facts:

Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino filed four informations before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with a criminal case pending before his sala.

Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The respondent court denied the motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.

Hence, petitoner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. It is the petitioner's position that the Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. He contended that under the Section 9(a) of the Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach of the Tanodbayan, and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in character, are within the powers of said official.

Issue:

Has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?

Held:

Yes. Petitioner’s argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well.

As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. To that extent, we agree with the petitioner's interpretation of the law that insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Tanodbayan's investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which administrative complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged.

As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607, as follows:

SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—There is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals and who shall be appointed by the President; ...

The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan: to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that the Tanodbayan may upon recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation except such allowances, per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.

xxx         xxx      xxx

SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the appropriate recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.

Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service."

Petition dismissed. 

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Merritt vs Government

MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916

Facts:

Merritt was riding on a motorcycle towards the western part of Calle Padre Faura at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck Merritt, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. As a result, Merritt was so severely injured. By authority of the United States, Act 2457 was enacted, authorizing the Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable

Held:

Government is not liable. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

● While consent to be sued was granted through a special law, the government was not held liable for damages, because under the attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a special agent.

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City of Caloocan vs Allarde

CITY OF CALOOCAN vs. ALLARDE

G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003

Facts:

In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.

In 1986 the City paid respondent Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries but the City refused to release the money to Santiago.

On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim. The City Government questioned the validity of the auction sale, alleging that the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles of the City.

On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended as payment for respondent Santiago’s claims.  This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.

Thus, on May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal with a warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a manager’s check amounting to P439,378.00.

Issue:

Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.

Held:

Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.

The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law:

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.

The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the “corresponding appropriation as required by law.” The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

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DFA vs NLRC

DFA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996

Facts:

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB.  Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA").  ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi.  

The ADB did not appeal the decision.  Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities.  The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity.  The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.

  

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.  The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.  According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign.  According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.

 “Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.  Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.  The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business.  If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.  If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.  The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community.  When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded.  In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity.  If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.  

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.  But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies.  In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.  In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect.  In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in  behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge.  The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels.  In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case.  When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.  

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Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. VINZON

G.R. No. 154705.  June 26, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.

Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

In turn, respondent filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit based on the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: “Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.” Respondent’s Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Republic of Indonesia is immune from suit

2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities

HELD:

1. Yes. International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.  In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.  All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”

The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change.  The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.  This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii.  On the other hand, we considered as an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City.

Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis.  Such act is only the start of the inquiry.  Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business?  If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.  If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity.  On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act.  The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity.  Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication.  We find no such waiver in this case.

Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function.  On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State.

We disagree.  There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.  A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep.  Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.  It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, “the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.  In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.” As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the Solicitor General states that it “was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.

2. No. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State.  He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

x x x

The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision.

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Moy Ya Lim Yao vs CIR

MOY YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-21289, 4 october 1971

Facts:

On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, was permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one month until 13 April 1961 through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. 

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

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In Re: Vicente Ching

IN RE: VICENTE CHING

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

In July 1998, Ching filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. The Supreme Court allowed Ching to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance, Ching submitted PRC Certification, Voter Certification and Certification that he was elected Sanggunian Bayan Member of Tubao, La Union.

Ching passed the bar exams but he was not allowed to take the oath because of his questionable citizenship status. In the Resolution dated 20 April 1999, the Supreme Court required Ching to submit further proof of his citizenship. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was also required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG commented that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625. The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years. In Cuenco case, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time."

Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999.

Issue:

Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time and if so whether his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.

Held:

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

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Republic vs Li Yao

REPUBLIC vs LI YAO

G.R. No. L-35947, October 20, 1992

Facts:

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949. After hearing, the Court granted the petition and declared Li Yao a naturalized Filipino citizen. Li Yao subsequently took his oath of allegiance.

About fifteen years later, or on January 5, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained.

Relying solely on the ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the government by under-declaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns for the years 1946-1951, the lower court granted the petition and cancelled the Certificate of Naturalization of Li Yao.

Li Yao appealed. After the parties had filed their respective briefs, Li Yao died.

Issues:

Whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.

Held:

Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act provides that a naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudelently and illegally."

It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment of income tax.

Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned.

In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds for denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.

Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. More specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court and legislation by Congress.

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