Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Facts:  

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari  to the Supreme Court,  it was  held that:  Fugitive  from justice  includes not  only those  who flee after conviction  to avoid punishment,  but  also those  who after  being charged,  flee to avoid  prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:  

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099.  July 24, 1996)

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Marquez vs Comelec

Facts:  

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40.    Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

         xxx         

(e)   Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then. 

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. 

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR. 

Issue: 

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed? 

Held: 

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. 

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. 

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. 

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)

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