Showing posts with label Election law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Election law. Show all posts

Victoria vs Comelec




FACTS:

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor.

On February 15, 1993, DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III designated private respondent Jesus James Calisin as acting Vice-Governor of the province pursuant to the COMELEC resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member with petitioner Juan Victoria of District 2 as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 22, 1993. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the proportion of the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.


HELD:

No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law. (G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994)



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Navarro vs Comelec




FACTS:

On March 25, 1999, elected Mayor Calimlim died thus creating a vacancy in his position. By virtue of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, Vice Mayor Aquino succeeded him. Accordingly, Danny Tamayo, the highest ranking member of Sanggunian, was elevated to position of the Vice-Mayor.

To fill the vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan, Gov. Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed petitioner Purto J. Navarro as member of the said Sanggunian. Navarro belonged to the same party as that of Tamayo.

Private respondents filed a civil action to nullify the appointment of Navarro before RTC Dagupan. When their motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and for the inhibition were denied, private respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. SC referred the case to the CA due to hierarchy of courts.

Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor’s political party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest-ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan. Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of RA 7160, the person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor Agbayani to petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.

In the decision of the CA, it concluded that according to the hierarchy, it was the appointment of the 8th Counselor, Rolando Lalas, to the 7th position which created the vacancy, therefore, the appointee should come from the party of Lalas.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Navarro as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan is valid.


HELD:

Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy xxx."

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the law. As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.

The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity. (G.R. No. 141307, March 28, 2001)


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Rodriguez vs. Comelec



Facts:  

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari  to the Supreme Court,  it was  held that:  Fugitive  from justice  includes not  only those  who flee after conviction  to avoid punishment,  but  also those  who after  being charged,  flee to avoid  prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.


Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?


Held:  

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099.  July 24, 1996)


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Caasi vs Court of Appeals





Facts: 

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

Sec. 68.  Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.


Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.


Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held:   No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.


Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held:   Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)


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