FACTS:
Due to
the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay,
Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of
the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor.
On
February 15, 1993, DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III designated private
respondent Jesus James Calisin as acting Vice-Governor of the province pursuant
to the COMELEC resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying Calisin of
District 1 as first ranking member with petitioner Juan Victoria of District 2 as
second ranking member. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of
votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of
registered voters in the district.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 22, 1993. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner
claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on
the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered
voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted
therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of
registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning
candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained.
Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may
have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a
higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out
to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the proportion of the votes obtained to the number of registered voters
of each district shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted
in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.
HELD:
No. The
law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the
total number of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court
has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate
as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.
Under
the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given it literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on
the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
Petitioner's
contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law,
which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be
addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to
change the law. ( G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994)