Facts:
On November 19, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed petitioner
Agustin B. Docena to succeed Luis B. Capito, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES), who died in office. Docena took his oath
on November 22, 1990 and assumed office.
On November 27, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed
respondent Socrates B. Alar to the position already occupied by Docena.
On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75
recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late
Board Capito.
On December 19, 1990, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary
Luis Santos when he addressed a letter to Alar recalling the appointment. This
action was affirmed by the Department of Local Government.
The SPES then reacted by passing resolution 1, where it reiterated
its previous recognition of Alar and declared that the recall letter of Santos
is void and has no legal basis and was issued by Santos because of his
whimsical, capricious, and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due
process of law.
Santos then issued another recall letter. However, this time, it
was addressed to Docena. Docena then instituted a mandamus case to recognize
him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He also seeks to hold the SPES
officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite
of his clear title to the disputed office.
Issue: Whether
or not the appointment of Alar should supersede that of Docena.
Held:
From
the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19, 1990, there is
no question that it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent
vacancy caused by Capito's death. As such, it was to be valid for the
unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to
serve "until noon of June 30, 1992," in accordance with Article
XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution.
The
said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed
office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For
all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's appointment had already
become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been
"superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar.
Docena's
appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner
having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled
and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature,
and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already
acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed
therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the
procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could
not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
Issue: Whether
or not mandamus is the proper remedy.
SPES
also argue that the petitioner should have sought to enforce his claimed right
in a petition not for mandamus but for quo warranto, as his purpose is to
challenge Alar's title to the disputed office. That is only secondary in
this case. The real purpose of the present petition is to compel the
respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a member of the body by virtue
of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local
Government.
Mandamus is employed to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is
entitled. In arguing that the recognition and admission of the petitioner is
not a ministerial duty, the respondents are asserting the discretion to review,
and if they so decide, reject, the Secretary's appointment. They have no such
authority. Faced with a strictly legal question, they had no right and
competence to resolve it in their discretion. What they should have done was
reserve their judgment on the matter, leaving it to the courts of justice to
decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. As a local
legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President of the
Philippines, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the
decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as her alter ego.
Even
assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may
in its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it
accordingly. We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the
prescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper
party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting
thereon, we hold that Docena has proved his right to the disputed office and
could not be legally replaced by Alar.
Issue: Is Docena
entitled to damages?
The
Court will make no award of damages, there being no sufficient proof to
overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit
erroneously.
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