Facts:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:
“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;”
Petitioner contended that the provision is not
applicable to him because he was granted probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves
moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects
Section 40(a)’s applicability.
Held:
1. Yes. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The elements of the crime of fencing which are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
2. The accused who is not
a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part
of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”
Moral turpitude is
deducible from the third element. Actual
knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays
the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes
of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and
in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or
theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately
reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or
“society” in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to
return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds
expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and
“Solutio Indebiti.
2.
No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In
fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality
when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending
resolution of the application for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)
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