Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of
the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to
file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a
candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e)
of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.
Issue:
What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?
Held:
"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)
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