Reopening of Trial



REOPENING OF TRIAL
Rule 119, Section 24, Rules of Court


Section 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.


What are the requirements for reopening a case?

(1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;

(2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;

(3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;

(4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and

(5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. (Cabarles vs. Judge Maceda, G.R. No. 161330, February 20, 2007)


When must a motion to reopen trial be filed?

After either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment. (Cabarles vs. Judge Maceda, ibid)


Who may reopen a trial?

The judge on his own initiative or upon motion.


Is hearing required?

Yes.

While Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted.  Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter.  This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard.  The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119. Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion. (Cabarles vs. Judge Maceda, ibid)


What is the purpose of the rule?

To prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.  However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.  This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. (Cabarles vs. Judge Maceda, ibid)


Distinguish motion to reopen from a motion for new trial or reconsideration

The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial (Alegre vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-56923, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 226).


Motion for New Trial

1.  Must be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

2.  May be applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1) and 121 (Section 2) of the Rules of Court.

3. The case is opened again after judgment for the reception of new evidence and further proceedings. 


Motion to Reopen Trial

1. May be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment.

2. The reopening of a case is controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice, resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession, or denial, by said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.

3.  It is still possible to have trials or hearings.


Motion for Reconsideration

1.  Must be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

2.  May be applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (Section 1) and 121 (Section 3) of the Rules of Court.

3. The case is not reopened for further proceeding.  The court is merely asked to reconsider its findings of law in order to make them conformable to the law applicable to the case. The judgment will be based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.


Nothing to reopen when the prosecution had not formally rested its case.

Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment. In the instant case, the records show that on April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to make its formal offer of evidence. This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the prosecution on April 16, 1999 that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next scheduled hearing the prosecution would rest its case. On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing after April 16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the prosecution could move to "reopen" the case for the taking of Abratique’s testimony. On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratique’s testimony was not for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base, we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judge’s mind be satisfied on any and all questions presented during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.


Appellant’s claim that the trial court’s concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution’s evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to complete the testimony of a prosecution witness. (People vs. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003)




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