Orcullo vs Gervacio

ORCULLO VS. GERVACIO

G.R. No. 134104.  September 14, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Nenita R. Orcullo was elected City Councilor of the Second District of Davao City in 1995.  She was chair of the Committee of Women Welfare and Development of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

In September, 1995, the City Government of Davao City, represented by the Vice-Mayor, named respondent Virginia Yap Morales as team leader of a study group in the conduct of the Action Study Towards Policy Formulation on the Welfare and Development of Women, in aid of legislation.

In 1996, due to financial constraints, Orcullo caused the suspension of the project. In 1997, Morales wrote the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao "requesting for assistance" to collect back wages. 

On March 20, 1997, petitioner having been furnished a copy of  the above letter, replied thereto.  She said that respondent Virginia Yap Morales was among women activists who volunteered to work for the codification of the Women Code, and she was endorsed to head the study team.  Acting thereon, on September 15, 1995, the Vice Mayor of Davao City, appointed respondent team leader of a study group for an action study towards policy formulation on women's welfare and development, in aid of proposed legislation.  As there was no budget for the project, petitioner recommended her appointment as technical assistant in the City Council of Davao City.  On October 24, 1995, respondent accepted the appointment and signed a contract of service with the City of Davao, represented by the Vice-Mayor, enforceable for the period October 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995, and upon expiration thereof, she was named as clerk II in the office of petitioner.  She received all salaries due her even during the time the work was suspended for three months, until the suspension of the project due to financial constraints.

In 1998, respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao issued an order directing Orcullo to pay respondent Morales back wages.

Orcullo filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of back wages was improper as there was no employer-employee relationship between her and respondent Morales, and that the office of the Ombudsman was without authority to issue such an order. Gervacio denied the motion for reconsideration.

On April 15, 1998, graft investigator Marilou B. Unabia issued a memorandum terminating the request for assistance of Morales and recommending that a case for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 be filed against Orcullo before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. Gervacio, Jr. approved the recommendation. Hence, Orcullo filed special civil action for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering petitioner personally to pay back wages to respondent Morales, who was named as team leader of a study group for a project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City, in aid of legislation.

Held:

No. The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao has no authority or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. As a money claim against petitioner personally, the claim is within the jurisdiction of a court of proper jurisdiction (depending on the amount of the claim).  If the money claim is against the City government of Davao City, the claim is within the jurisdiction of the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod), or other proper government agency, but not the office of the Ombudsman.

The respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao cannot invoked Section 15 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:

“SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

“x x x

“(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;”

The above quoted provision does not vest the Ombudsman with authority to order a public official to pay a money claim of an aggrieved party. The provision authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities. It does not authorize the Ombudsman to directly order the payment of claims for wages, salaries or compensations of aggrieved parties.

What is more, respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao abused the functions of his office by approving a recommendation of a graft investigator to file with his own office an anti-graft case against petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, who was just exercising the duties of her office as an elected local legislator of the City of Davao.  Petitioner could not be personally liable for the payment of the wages, salary or  honorarium of a "team leader" assisting her as local legislator of Davao City in crafting a piece of legislation on women's code.  She was not even the one who hired respondent to undertake the project.  Petitioner's refusal to pay was not in bad faith, much less evident bad faith.  Hence, she could not be liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

"Any further prosecution then of petitioner was pure harassment."

Consequently, the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in issuing the questioned orders.  Although petitioner could have elevated the ruling of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao to the Ombudsman in Manila, the threat of prosecution of petitioner before the Deputy Ombudsman’s own office created an immediate urgency for judicial relief.

Petition granted. Orders of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao annulled. Graft Investigation Officer Unabia enjoined to desist from further acting on the case.

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Khan vs Ombudsman

KHAN VS. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), were charged before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) with violation of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders.

Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019.

The Deputy Ombudsman denied petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss, ruling that although PAL was originally organized as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the GSIS. Therefore, it became a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan. The Deputy Ombudsman also held that petitioners were public officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b). Under that provision, public officers included "elective, appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the Government."

Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman which affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman.

Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsman's jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include PAL, a private entity created under the general corporation law; (2) Quimpo does not apply to the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns "public officers," thus, they cannot be investigated or prosecuted under that law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over GOCC without original charter

2. Whether or not the Quimpo case apply to the case at bar

3. Whether or not petitioners PAL officers are public officers

HELD:

1. Jurisdiction of the ombudsman over GOCCS is confined only to those with original charters

Article XI, Section 13(2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (italics supplied)

xxx       xxx       xxx

Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.

In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the phrase "with original charter" means "chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code." PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners.

2. Quimpo Not Applicable to the Case at Bar

Quimpo is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo charged in 1984 two officers of PETROPHIL in the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) for violation of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as officers/employees of a private company. The Court declared that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because PETROPHIL ceased to be a private entity when Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired its shares.

In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this case (like PETROPHIL, PAL's shares were also acquired by the government), closer scrutiny reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here.

In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to "perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil." The fact that the purpose in acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to oil was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan's jurisdiction over it. This was certainly not the case with PAL. The records indicate that the government acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were involved.

Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the 1973 Constitution which the Court relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL's accused officers, particularly Article XIII, Section 6. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations" in the 1973 Constitution was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters.

3. Petitioners, as then Officers of PAL, were not Public Officers

Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) defines who "public officers" are. Instead, its varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. Usually quoted in our decisions is Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject. In the 2002 case of Laurel v. Desierto,15 the Court extensively quoted his exposition on the term "public officers":

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.

xxx       xxx       xxx

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; − that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are those endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions. The explication of the term is also consistent with the Court's pronouncement in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed "public officers" if their corporations are tasked to carry out governmental functions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the Ombudsman are restrained from proceeding with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against petitioners for violation of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996, respectively, are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

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Caoibes vs. Ombudsman

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein.

Facts:

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above.

On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.

On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the administrative case

Held:

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. (Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001)

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