Facts: Carlos
Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty
candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the
ground that the latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four
counts of direct bribery.
COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from
running for the position of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
as follows:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who
has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18)
months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or
granted amnesty.
According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service
of his sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his
five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral
turpitude. Likewise, he claims that
Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is
the law applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the
COMELEC. Said provision reads:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
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Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March
5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the
two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government
Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he
was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
Issue: Whether
or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude
Held: Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.”
However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It
frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In
this case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements
of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but
the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and
position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Issue: What
law should apply in the case?
Held: The Local Government Code.
The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local
Government Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction
that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed
to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local
Government Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In
accordance therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section
12 of the OEC.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and
not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the
subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent
of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for
local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the
manifest intent.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral
turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the
2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to
Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s
disqualification ceased as of March 2000. (
