Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.
Basis
Pars. (a) and
(b) is based upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais.
● The fact which a party in estoppel has represented to be true is conclusively presumed as against him to be true and he is not permitted to introduce evidence to the contrary. (Lazo vs. Republic Surety, L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970)
● The ownership of the landlord at start of the tenancy relation is conclusively presumed as against the tenant and the latter is not permitted to dispute such fact.
Estoppel (Arts. 1431-1439, Civil Code)
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are
hereby adopted insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this
Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as
between the parties thereto or their successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the
owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or
grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation
of another sells or alienates a thing, the former cannot subsequently set up
his own title as against the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is
estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the
lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between
third persons concerning immovable property, one of them is misled by a person
with respect to the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is
precluded from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all
these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or
wrongful concealment of facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other
should act upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the
true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance
with the misrepresentation.
Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to
assume apparent ownership of personal property for the purpose of making any
transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum for which a pledge has been
constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge of the property, made by
the other to a pledgee who received the same in good faith and for value.
Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)
Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of
Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some guerilla soldiers would arrest her for
investigation, because one Conchita Cuba complained to them against her for
having illegally encroached on her property. Afraid to be taken to the guerilla
camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for her to do. He suggested that she
execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor for the portion in question
which was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order that he could defend her
rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba. Manjon accepted the
suggestion and asked Molina to have the corresponding deed of sale prepared
which Manjon signed. However, Manjon made Molina sign a statement in which he
expressly admitted that the transaction was only a simulated sale. Molina
denied the whole story and asserted that the statement was a forgery. Manjon
sues Molina for recovery of possession of land. TC
ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land
because it was part of the public domain, sales patent having been issued to
plaintiff by the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by
deed, when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and
delivers it and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee. Case remanded to determine
whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994) The juridical relation
between petitioners and private respondents is that of lessee and lessor.
Considering this jural relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they
purchased the questioned lot from somebody else. A tenant cannot, in an action
involving the possession of the leased premises, controvert the title of his
landlord. Nor can a tenant set up any inconsistent right to change the relation
existing between himself and his landlord, without first delivering up to the
landlord the premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between themselves.
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