Sec. 37. Dying declaration. – The
declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending
death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
What are dying declarations?
Dying declarations are the statements
made by a person after the mortal wounds have been inflicted, under the
belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause of, and
the circumstances surrounding the homicide. (Wharton's Criminal Evidence)
Requisites for admissibility
1. That
death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact
▪ Considerations
for the consciousness of imminent death:
a. Words
or statements of the declarant
b. His
conduct at the time the declaration was made
c. Serious
nature of his wounds as to engender a belief on his part that he would not
survive therefrom
2. That
the declaration refers to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such
death
3. That
the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to
4. That
the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant’s death is the
subject of the inquiry.
● This is the most significant exception to the
hearsay evidence rule. If before he died, X told a police officer that it was Y
who shot him, it would be the officer who would be testifying in court. The
officer has no personal knowledge of the event. If the dying declaration of X
is offered to prove the guilt of Y, the testimony of the officer in court is
definitely hearsay. The dying declaration of X is however, an exception to the
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. There has been a traditional acceptance of
dying declarations because of the presumption that a dying person will tell the
truth before he meets his Creator. While there is no guarantee that a person in
the throes of death will tell the truth, this assumption has been traditionally
accepted for almost two hundred years, an assumption which has trickled down to
modern times.
● The most significant element therefore, of a
dying declaration is that the declaration must have been conscious of his
impending death. It is this consciousness which is assumed to be the compelling
motive to tell the truth.
● To be admissible as a dying declaration, the
declaration must relate to the cause and circumstances of the declarant. Any
statement he makes not related to the circumstances of his death is
inadmissible as a dying declaration.
● The dying declaration is admissible in any case
provided the subject of inquiry in that case is the death of the declarant. The
old rule that it is admissible only in a criminal case no longer holds true
because of the phraseology of Sec. 37 of Rule 130.
● It is required that the declarant should die. If
he lives, there is no need for the dying declaration because the declarant may
testify personally based on his own personal knowledge. Suppose by chance he
survives but is unable to testify due to severe physical and emotional
infirmity, may his declaration be admitted in evidence? Yes but not as a dying
declaration. It could be admitted as a statement made by a person immediately
subsequent to a startling occurrence. The shooting of the declarant is the
startling occurrence. The statement made as to the circumstances of the
shooting, while not a dying declaration because he survived, could be
considered as part of the res gestae under Sec. 42 of Rule
130.
● Intervening time from the making of the
declaration up to the actual death is immaterial as long as the declaration was
made under the consciousness of impending death and as long as no retraction
was made by the declarant before his death
Cases
People v.
Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)
Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11
hours later, as the victim was about to be taken to the hospital, a patrolman
was able to get his statement as to the identity of the perpetrators. The
victim was unable to sign the statement and he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae
because of the lapse of considerable time between the commission of the offense
and the taking of the statement. However, the statement amounts to a dying
declaration, as it is a statement coming from a seriously wounded person even
if death occurs hours or days after it was inflicted if there be showing that
it was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time he made
his declaration until the end came. There is no need for proof that the
declarant state "that he has given up the hope of life.” It is enough if.
from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have
been his state of mind. It is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to
lead inevitably to the conclusion that the time [of such statement] the
declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. Its
admissibility is not affected by death occurring hours or days afterwards.
People v.
Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain
found him lying on the sand at the bank of a river. Pablo’s hands were tied on
his back and he was lying face down. The barrio captain took Pablo’s
ante-mortem statement and learned that he was Pablo Remonde, he was shot by
Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was not sure if he would survive the gunshot
wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was
charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is not a
dying declaration because it was not made under the consciousness of an
impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde
is not admissible as a dying declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to
whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremis, at the point of death when every hope of recovery
is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as
an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as part of the
res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the
deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the
accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of
impending death was inferred from the extent of the injuries. In Laquinon,
the declarant expressly said that he was not sure that we was going to die. The
moral of the story is, in taking a dying declaration, don’t ask if the
declarant thinks he will die.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)
Facts: Catralino Espina was found by his
grandnephew in his house lying and wounded. Espina asked for the police. When
police officers arrived, they asked Espina “who slashed and robbed” him. Espina
answered that it was Sabio. His declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by
him. Sabio was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide. Sabio questions
the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not made under
the consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery
for his first word to his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of
the injury on the victim's forehead which had affected the brain and was
profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak unless his head was raised;
the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible
for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of the
wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have
known that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till 3 days after
the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief
in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the
dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told his grandnephew to
fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of
recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to
disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence
supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial and does not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away personality
belonging to the offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged
robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing objects recovered. The
consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor presumed from the
circumstance that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his
shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the
things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can the dying
declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The
admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of death.
Interval of time may be taken into account where
the declaration was ambiguous as to whether the declarant believed that his
death was imminent when he made the declaration.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been
admissible as proof of Sabio’s guilt of robbery as a part of the res gestae?
People v. de
Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her
grandson, Alvin Valencia, came home and found her wounded. He asked his
grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said:
"Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not
disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya. De Joya
was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be
complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant
must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression
of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such
fact. The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was
expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. It is
immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the
statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it.
Thus, if an interruption cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less
than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is
not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be
of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person
finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Since the declarant was
prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have
been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That
incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased
victim here was incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by
themselves a sensible sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover,
be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?" The
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the
words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But
Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to
regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the
doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I
disagree with this decision. Under the context, what else could have “Si Paqui”
meant other than that he was responsible for the crime?
People vs.
Antonio (1970)
Where the declarant stated that he would not die if
treated, such statement indicates an awareness of death and the nature of his
wound and his death an hour later qualifies such statement into a dying
declaration, or at least, as part of res gestae.
People vs.
Gueron (1983)
Where, shortly after he was wounded, the victim was
asked as to whether he believed he would die and to which he replied, “I cannot
ascertain,” and he died the following day, his statement is admissible both as
part of res gestae and as a dying declaration.
People vs. Laquinon (1985)
Where the victim, when asked as to whether he
thought he would die, replied, “I don’t know,” his declaration was not made
under the consciousness of his imminent death and does not qualify as an
antemortem statement, although the same may be admitted as part of the res
gestae since it was made immediately after the incident
• The
credibility and weight of the admitted dying declaration should be determined
under the same rules used in other testimonial evidence
• A
dying declaration is admissible only to insofar as it refers to facts regarding
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death
• A
dying declaration is admissible in any case as long as the requisite concur
• A
dying declaration may be oral or written or made by signs which could be
testified to by a witness thereto
People vs. Odencio
(1979)
If the antemortem statement was made orally, the
witness who heard it may testify thereto, without necessarily reproducing the
exact words as long as he can give the substance thereof, and if the deceased
had an unsigned dying declaration, the same may be used as a memorandum by the
witness who took it down
May be attacked on the absence of any of the
requisites and may be impeached in the same manner as the testimony of any
other witness on the stand
American jurisprudence: dying declarations are on
the same footing as testimony of a witness on a stand and whatever would
disqualify the witness would also make such declaration incompetent evidence
People vs.
Molas (1993)
Facts: Bernardo Resonable went home after
working in his farm. There he found his son Abelardo (8) bleeding at the
doorway of their house. Bernardo carried Abelardo inside the house. Abelardo
informed his father that Josue Molas was the person who not only inflicted his
injuries but also stabbed his sister Dulcesima and mother Soledad. Molas and
Dulcesima were sweethearts and engaged to be married. While Bernardo looked for
the bodies of his wife and daughter, Abelardo was brought to the hospital by
his brother Nicholas. Abelardo died the next day.
Issue: WON the statement of Abelardo is
admissible
Held: Yes
Ratio: Abelardo’s statement was given to his
father while he lay at death’s door, bleeding from stab wounds, as a result of
which he died the next day.
It was indubitably a dying declaration. To be admissible, a dying
declaration must:
1. Concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death
2. That
the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending
death
3. That he
was a competent witness
4. That
his declaration was offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder
or parricide in which the declarant is the victim
All these circumstances were present when Abelardo
made his declaration
People vs. Molo
(1979)
Facts: Not long after the couple Venacio
Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa had retired for the night, Simeona heard and
indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing teeth. Venacio was asleep by then.
Although seized by fear, Simeona managed to peep through the dilapidated buri
wall and saw Dominador Molo attired only in short pants, alone. She tried to
awaken Venacio but he did not respond. Molo had already climbed up the stairs
and barged into the house. When he found Venacio asleep near the door, he
immediately grabbed the latter’s left wrist and started hacking the old man.
Venacio woke up and tried to fight back but he was unable to retaliate because
Molo started hacking him again. Simeona rushed out of the house and called for
help. Her son Alejandro and Roman Mangaring ran towards the house and there
they found Venacio bleeding profusely. When Alejandro took his father in his
arms, Venacio told him that he was boloed by Boslo, the name by which Molo was
known in their locality. Roman also asked Venacio who his assailant was and the
latter answered Boslo. Venacio was rushed to the hospital where he died a few
minutes after arrival.
Issue: WON the statements made by Venacio to
Alejandro and Roman are admissible
Held: Yes
Ratio: The statements of Venacio identifying
Molo as his assailant to Alejandro and Roman are dying declarations.
Considering the nature of the wounds, 8 in all, Venacio must have the
seriousness of his condition and that it can therefore be inferred that he made
the incrimination under the consciousness of an impending death.
People v.
Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb.
20, 1996
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