Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that
one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
Reason for the rule
It is clear that evidence of other crimes compels the defendant to meet
charges of which the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his
defense, raises a variety of issue, and thus diverts the attention of the court
from the charge immediately before it. The rule may be said to be an
application of the principle that the evidence must be confined to the point in
issue in the case on trial. In other words, evidence of collateral offenses
must not be received as substantive evidence of the
offenses on trial
Applicability
Sec. 34 is the second branch of the rule of res inter alios acta (Rule
130, Sec. 28) and applies to both civil and criminal cases.
Cases
In a trial for arson, the prosecution
may prove that the accused had attempted to set fire to the house on the day
previous to the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of showing
the intent of the accused in subsequently setting fire to the house. Where a
person is charged wit the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be
received of the other similar acts committed about the same time, only for the
purpose of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for
protassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison, causing the death of two
horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the drug store of
the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to
be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible
in order to demonstrate defendant's motive and negligence. It is permissible to
ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the
defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in
good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than
the frequency of accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which
tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another
offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered
Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her money and jewelry. As she turned over the
items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on
his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a police line-up and
was charged. During the trial, Maximiana’s neighbor, Juana de la Cruz,
testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by
malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on
the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly
corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony that the man of the same description was
the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution
for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends
to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time
charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
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