Caasi vs Court of Appeals





Facts: 

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

Sec. 68.  Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.


Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.


Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held:   No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.


Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held:   Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)


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Marquez vs Comelec



Facts:  

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40.    Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
         xxx         
(e)   Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad



Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then. 

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. 

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR. 


Issue: 

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed? 


Held: 

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. 

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. 

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. 

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)


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Dela Torre vs Comelec




Facts: 

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40.  Disqualifications.  The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

“(a)  Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;”
 
Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he was granted probation by the MTC. 


Issues: 

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability. 


Held: 

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

1.  A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”


Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element.  Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.  And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.



2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)


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P.D. No. 1613



PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1613
AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON

WHEREAS, findings of the police and intelligence agencies of the government reveal that fires and other crimes involving destruction in Metro Manila and other urban centers in the country are being perpetuated by criminal syndicates, some of which have foreign connections;

WHEREAS, the current law on arson suffer from certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction be prevented to protect the national economy and preserve the social economic and political stability of the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land, the following:


Sec. 1. Arson. — Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by Prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.


Sec. 2. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of Reclusion temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishment where explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are stored.

2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social services.

3. Any church or place or worship or other building where people usually assemble.

4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or property.

5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official proceedings.

6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building.

7. Any building, whether used as dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.


Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty of Reclusion temporal to Reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any uninhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain filed, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;

5. Any rice mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.


Sec. 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. — The penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:

1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.


Sec. 5. Where Death Results From Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.


Sec. 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. — Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.

2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.

3. Gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked therewith or containers, thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.

4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.

5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.

6. If shortly before the fire a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.


7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.


Sec. 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. — Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.


Sec. 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. — The building which is the object of arson including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.


Sec. 9. Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and all laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.


Sec. 10. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication thereof at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.


Done in the City of Manila this 7th day of March nineteen hundred and seventy nine.


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Republic Act No. 6085



REPUBLIC ACT No. 6085

AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES.

Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames."

Section 2. Section Two of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other, than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry."

Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two, is hereby amended to read as Follows:

"Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he was registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person who obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public or private transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without stating or affixing his real or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been authorized to use."

Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended by the insertion of the following new section to be designated Section four to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act and subject to the provisions of section 1 hereof, all persons who have used any name and/or names and alias or aliases different from those authorized in section one of this act and duly recorded in the local civil registry, shall be prohibited to use such other name or names and/or alias or aliases."

Section 5. Section four of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as Section five, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of from one year to five years and a fine of P5,000 to P10,000."

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and all Acts, rules or regulations of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Approved: August 4, 1969.


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Republic Act No. 8049




REPUBLIC ACT No. 8049

AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES IN FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR

Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.

Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall indicate the period of the initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days, shall include the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and shall further contain an undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.

Section 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least two (2) representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The person or persons who participated in the hazing shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation results there from.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or blind.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member shall have become incapacitated for the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety (90) days.

5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than thirty (30) days.

6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of ten (10) days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.

7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one (1) to nine (9) days, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.

8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day to 6 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance.

The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction. The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in any of the following instances:

(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on the person of the recruit who refuses to join;

(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;

(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;

(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or

(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.

The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.

The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed shall be liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring shall be liable as principal.

The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.

Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.


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Act No. 3326 as amended



ACT NO. 3326

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Provided, however, That all offenses against any law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. 

Violations of the regulations or conditions of certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Service Commission, shall prescribe after two months. (As amended by Act No. 3585 and by Act No. 3763, approved November 23, 1930.)

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.

Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved: December 4, 1926


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