Jainal vs Comelec

FACTS:

Petitioner Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and private respondent Julhatab J. Talib were candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004 elections. On May 20, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Jainal as the winning candidate.

On 23 May 2004, Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with the COMELEC praying for the annulment of election returns pertaining to twenty-one (21) precincts, and for his proclamation as the Mayor. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to leave the precincts before the counting and the preparation of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and his official watchers, a fact which indicates that said election returns were manufactured. Talib also noted that the number of votes cast exceeded the number of voters in Precinct Nos. 33A and 34A.

Jainal prayed for the dismissal of Talib’s petition, contending that the latter’s allegations were the proper subject of an election protest in the proper trial court.

On March 22, 2005, the COMELEC (2nd Division) issued a Resolution, granting the petition in part, annulling the election returns from nine precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was likewise annulled. Jainal filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On September 18, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied reconsideration but modified the resolution of its 2nd Division by declaring the election return pertaining to Precinct 9A of Barangay Adjid as valid.

Talib filed the instant petition, including Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor, who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code, will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.

Vice-Mayor Hussi Ahajan Ahajan took his oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant to the COMELEC resolutions of 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006.

Jainal likewise filed Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation before the COMELEC EN BANC praying for an order suspending the implementation and execution of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 COMELEC resolutions.

On 5 October 2006, the COMELEC granted the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation of Jainal and ordered Hussi Ahajan (Vice Mayor) to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

Ahajan questions the validity of the 5 October 2006 Order of the COMELEC which directed him, as Vice-Mayor, or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the COMELEC rightfully issued the 5 October 2006 Order directing the Vice Mayor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor.

HELD: No.

Under Sec. 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by this Court. The effects of the 22 March 2005 and 18 September 2006 resolutions can no longer be suspended not only because the resolutions are already final and executory but also because the power to suspend enforcement lies only with this Court. Thus, in granting the motion and ordering the Vice-Mayor or any ranking councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of Acting Mayor of Indanan, Sulu, it committed what amounts to a usurpation of this Courts prerogative that is to issue the TRO which is precisely one of the reliefs sought in the present petition. It behooved the COMELEC en banc to deny or at least refuse to take action on the Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation.

With the nullification of petitioners proclamation, the position of Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu is vacant. The Local Government Code is clear on the matter of succession.

Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. ─ If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein:

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner’s proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and may be qualified as a permanent incapacity to discharge the functions of his office. Ahajans assumption of the office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were nullified. (G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007)

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Docena vs Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar

Facts:

On November 19, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed petitioner Agustin B. Docena to succeed Luis B. Capito, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES), who died in office. Docena took his oath on November 22, 1990 and assumed office.

On November 27, 1990, DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos appointed respondent Socrates B. Alar to the position already occupied by Docena.

On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Capito.

On December 19, 1990, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Luis Santos when he addressed a letter to Alar recalling the appointment. This action was affirmed by the Department of Local Government.

The SPES then reacted by passing resolution 1, where it reiterated its previous recognition of Alar and declared that the recall letter of Santos is void and has no legal basis and was issued by Santos because of his whimsical, capricious, and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due process of law.

Santos then issued another recall letter. However, this time, it was addressed to Docena. Docena then instituted a mandamus case to recognize him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He also seeks to hold the SPES officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite of his clear title to the disputed office.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Alar should supersede that of Docena.

Held:

From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19, 1990, there is no question that it was intended to be permanent, to fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capito's death. As such, it was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was entitled to serve "until noon of June 30, 1992," in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution.

The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar.

Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy.

SPES also argue that the petitioner should have sought to enforce his claimed right in a petition not for mandamus but for quo warranto, as his purpose is to challenge Alar's title to the disputed office. That is only secondary in this case. The real purpose of the present petition is to compel the respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a member of the body by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local Government.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that the recognition and admission of the petitioner is not a ministerial duty, the respondents are asserting the discretion to review, and if they so decide, reject, the Secretary's appointment. They have no such authority. Faced with a strictly legal question, they had no right and competence to resolve it in their discretion. What they should have done was reserve their judgment on the matter, leaving it to the courts of justice to decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. As a local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President of the Philippines, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as her alter ego.

Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it accordingly. We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the prescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.

Issue: Is Docena entitled to damages?

The Court will make no award of damages, there being no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit erroneously.

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Abella vs Municipality of Naga

Facts:                       

The appellant through a resolution closed a road which ran through the public market and Abella’s property. Portion of the road was closed for the expansion of the public market. As a result of the closure and subsequent expansion permanent structures were built. These improvements chomped off the sidewalk and abutted to the petitioner’s property, they extended to the middle of a street depriving Abella of the use thereof. Abella sought damages from the CFI of Camarines Sur, which ruled in her favor by ordering the municipality to pay P300 pesos for damages. Aggrieved, the municipality appealed to the SC. 

 

Issue:

Whether or not the municipality is liable for damages considering that it merely exercised its police power to preserve peace and good order of the community and promote general welfare.

Held:

Yes. The municipality was not charged with any unlawful act, or with invading Abella’s property rights, it was not found guilty of any such acts. What is in issue in this case is the liability for damages. Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

“No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person.”

(G.R. No. L-3738, November 20, 1951)

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Lingating vs Comelec

Facts:

During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint was filed against him and several other individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds and violation RA No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.  Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal shortly thereafter.  The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.

Pending appeal,  then Vice‐Mayor Vicente  Imbing took his oath  and assumed the  office of  Mayor of  Lapuyan on  March 3,  1992 pursuant  to Section 68  of the  Local Gov't  Code which allows  for the  execution pending appeal  of administrative  decisions. From February 1992 to August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-91 nor has the Sanggunian resolved Sulong’s MR/Appeal.

In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position of Mayor of Lapuyan. On May  3, 2001, Lingating  file a petition for disqualification of Sulong on the ground  that the latter is disqualified  from running for any elective local  position having been removed  from office during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of  the Local  Government Code. Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final and executory since up to the filing of the disqualification case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Lapuyan.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.  Respondent Sulong filed an  MR arguing that the decision  in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and  executory; that at no time had he been removed  by virtue of the said decision, and  that  the issue  was moot and academic having been "overtaken   by the local elections  of May 11, 1992." 

Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that Sulong was succeeded by Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91 had indeed become final. Lingating also prayed that he be installed as Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.

The COMELEC First Division denied Lingating’s motion on the ground that the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. 

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing Aguinaldo v. COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic. It also ruled that respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated.    

Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC.  Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable case is Reyes v. COMELEC where the court held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC.  Hence, this petition.    

Issue:

Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election

Held:

The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter re-elected for another term. However, Aguinaldo is not applicable as at the time the case was decided, there was no provision similar to   40(b) of the LGC and hence, cannot be given retroactive effect. Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to this day, not final. (G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002)

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Magno vs Comelec

Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.

COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.  Likewise, he claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the law applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC.  Said provision reads:

Section 40. Disqualifications. -  The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

xxx

Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000.  Thus, he was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.

Issue: Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude

Held: Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and

4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element.  The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.

Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: What law should apply in the case?

Held: The Local Government Code.

The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local Government Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.

Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of the OEC.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 2000.  (G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002)

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Antichresis

Define antichresis

Antichresis is a contract by virtue of which the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (Art. 2132, CC)

Characteristics of antichresis

1. Accessory contract

2. Formal contract - it must be in writing

3. Deal only with immovable property

4. Real right

5. Real contract

6. Can guarantee all kinds of valid obligations. 

It is not essential that the loan should earn interest in order that it can be guaranteed with a contract of antichresis. Antichresis is susceptible of guaranteeing all kinds of obligations, pure or conditional. (Javier vs. Valliser, No. 2648-R, April 29, 1950; Sta. Rosa vs. Noble, 35 O.G. 27241)

Delivery of the property to the creditor is required only in order that the creditor may receive the fruits and not for the validity of the contract.

How is a contract of antichresis be validly established?

The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the contract of antichresis shall be void.  (Art. 2134, CC)

How should the amount of payment in antichresis be determined?

The actual market value of the fruits at the time of the application thereof to the interest and principal shall be the measure of such application. (Art. 2133, CC)

What are the obligations of the creditor?

1.) The creditor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, is obliged to pay the taxes and charges upon the estate.

2.) He is also bound to bear the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair. The sums spent for the purposes stated in this article shall be deducted from the fruits. (Art. 2135, CC)

3.) To apply the fruits received for the payment of the outstanding interest, if any, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.

How can the creditor be exempted from the obligations imposed by Art. 2135, CC?

The creditor may exempt himself from the two obligations imposed by Art. 2135 by compelling the debtor to enter again upon the enjoyment of the property, except when there is a stipulation to the contrary. (Art. 2136, CC)

Can the debtor reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable?

The debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.

But the latter, in order to exempt himself from the obligations imposed upon him by the preceding article, may always compel the debtor to enter again upon the enjoyment of the property, except when there is a stipulation to the contrary. (Art. 2136, CC)

The property delivered stands as a security for the payment of the obligation of the debtor in antichresis. Hence, the debtor cannot demand its return until the debt is totally paid. 

The debtor can only demand the return of the property after having fully paid his obligations to the creditor. It is not fair for the creditor to regain the possession of the property when his debt has not been fully paid. Until there is full payment of the obligation, the property shall stand as security therefor. (Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, No. 18574, September 20, 1922, 43 Phil 770)

May the creditor acquire ownership of the real estate for non-payment of debt?

The creditor does not acquire the ownership of the real estate for non-payment of the debt within the period agreed upon. Every stipulation to the contrary shall be void. (Art. 2137, CC)

What is the remedy of the creditor in case of non-payment of his credit?

The creditor may petition the court for the payment of the debt or the sale of the real property. In this case, the Rules of Court on the foreclosure of mortgages shall apply. (Art. 2137, CC)

1. Action for collection

2. Petition for the public sale of the property

Interest be compensated with the fruits

The contracting parties may stipulate that the interest upon the debt be compensated with the fruits of the property which is the object of the antichresis, provided that if the value of the fruits should exceed the amount of interest allowed by the laws against usury, the excess shall be applied to the principal. (Art. 2138, CC)

Is prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership available to the creditor in antichresis?

No. An antichretic creditor cannot acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The creditor is not a possessor in the concept of owner butmere holder placed in possession of the land by the owner. Hence, their possession cannot serve as title for acquiring dominion. (Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38185, September 24, 1986)

Antichresis vs. contract of sale with a right of repurchase

1) Antichresis is an accessory contract, whereas sale with right of repurchase is a principal and independent contract.

2) In the first, there is no transfer of the title over the property from the debtor to the creditor, whereas in the second there is a transfer of the title over the property from the vendor a retro to the vendee a retro although conditional.

3) In the first, if the debtor fails to pay his debt, the creditor cannot appropriate the property or dispose of it, whereas in the second, as soon as there is a consolidation of title in the vendee a retro, he may dispose of it as absolute owner.

4) In the first, if the debtor fails to pay his debt within the time agreed upon, the creditor does not acquire the ownership of the property, whereas in the second, if the vendor a retro does not redeem the property within the time agreed upon, the vendee a retro irrevocably acquires absolute ownership thereof.

Antichresis vs. pledge

1) Antichresis is a consensual contract whereas pledge is a real contract.

2) In the first, the subject matter is a real property, whereas in the second, the subject matter is a personal property.

3) In the first, the requirement that the contract must be in writing is essential for validity, whereas in the second, the requirement that the contact must be in public instrument is merely for the purpose of binding third persons. 

4) In the first, the foreclosure in case of non-payment of debt is as a rule judicial, although the parties may agree to make it extrajudicial whereas in the second, the sale in case of non-payment of the debt is always extrajudicial.

Antichresis vs. real estate mortgage

1) In antichresis, the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of the property, but with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest and thereafter to the principal of his credit, whereas in real estate mortgage, the creditor does not acquire such right.

2) In the first, the creditor as a rule is in possession of the property, whereas in the second, the debtor is always in possession of the property.

3) In the first, the requirement that the contract must be in writing is essential for validity, whereas in the second, the requirement that the contact must be registered in the Registry of Property is merely for the purpose of binding third persons.

4) In the first, there is an obligation of the creditor to pay taxes and charges upon the property as well as the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair, whereas in the second, such obligation is not imposed upon the creditor.

5) In the first, foreclosure in case of non-payment of debts is a rule judicial, although the parties may agree to make it extra-judicial, whereas in the second, the foreclosure may be judicial or extra-judicial at the option of the creditor. 

A obtains a loan of P500 from B and delivers to the latter a piece of coconut land as security for the payment of the loan. In the deed executed, A agreed that B would avail of the fruits of the land during the time that the loan remains unpaid, without saying that the value of said fruits should be applied to the interest or the capital of the loan. What is the nature of the contract between the parties?

It is submitted that the contract in this case is a type of equitable mortgage, because, although it lacks some of the formalities required by law, nevertheless, it shows the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for the payment of a debt and contains nothing that is contrary to law (Art. 1602, CC). Strictly speaking, it cannot be considered a contract of antichresisbecause it lacks the requisite regarding the obligation of the creditor to apply the fruits received by him to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (Art. 1232, CC) In spite of the fact that it is a type of equitable mortgage where the mortgagee is in possession, it has been held by the Supreme Court, however, that the rights and obligations of the parties are similar and in any respect identical with those in a contract of antichresis. (Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, 43 Phil 770; Diaz vs. Mendezona, 48 Phil 666; Miranda vs. Imperial, 77 Phil 1066) 

In 1941 D borrowed P2,000 from C. As security for the loan, the former conveyed to the latter a parcel of unregistered land. This conveyance is evidenced by a deed which the parties call “sangla” or “prenda” in the dialect. The records show that since 1941 C had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property, and that in 1950, the tax declaration was changed to his name. In 1958 D died survived by his son X. Subsequently, X brought an action against C for the recovery of the land and for an accounting of the fruits. C, however, interposed the defense of prescription. Decide.

X’s action against C will prosper. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the contract in this case indicates a mortgage which, coupled with the delivery of possession of the land to the creditor, amounts to a contract of antichresis (Diaz vs. Mendezona, 48 Phil. 666; Miranda vs. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1066; Trillana vs. Manansala, 51 Off. Gaz. 2911).

BAR Q& A

Olivia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly manage due to a lingering illness. Since she is indebted to Peter in the amount of P500.000.00 she asks Peter to manage the plantation and apply the harvest to the payment of her obligation to him, principal and interest, until her indebtedness shall have been fully paid. Peter agrees. 1) What kind of contract is entered into between Olivia and Peter? Explain. 2) What specific obligations are imposed by law on Peter as a consequence of their contract? 3) Does the law require any specific form for the validity of their contract? Explain 4) May Olivia re-acquire the plantation before her entire indebtedness shall have been fully paid? Explain. (1995)

Suggested Answer:

1. A contract of antichresis was entered into between Olivia and Peter. Under Article 2132 of the New Civil Code, by a contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.

2. Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and bear the necessary expenses for preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art, 2135, NCC)

3. The amount of the principal and interest must be specified in writing, otherwise the antichresis will be void. (Art. 2134, NCC)

4.  No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor. However, it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do so in order to exempt him from his obligation under Art. 2135, NCC, The debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment unless Peter compels Olivia to enter again the enjoyment of the property. 

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Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Facts:  

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari  to the Supreme Court,  it was  held that:  Fugitive  from justice  includes not  only those  who flee after conviction  to avoid punishment,  but  also those  who after  being charged,  flee to avoid  prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:  

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099.  July 24, 1996)

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