Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was
protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and
void on the ground of failure of elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months
before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of
a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s
opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition
for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three
consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner.
The COMELEC granted the petition for
disqualification.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity
of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only
two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be
counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit
for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased
to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a
petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule
36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the
petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of
one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years
until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as
service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction
over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: 1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
“To recapitulate,
the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.”
The two requisites for the application of the
three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the
May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation
as winner was declared null and void.
His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court
that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995
to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed
office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to
have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term.
The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have
served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion
of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. The
second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity
of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly
elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his
assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term
for purposes of computing the three term limit.
The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to
run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the
proclamation or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition
for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC
of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates
that:
“Sec.
6. Effects of disqualification Case.-
any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.”
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC
should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the
petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified
will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been
proclaimed.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a
disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a
candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification
is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation.” ( Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)