FACTS:
Petitioner Uy subleased
from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building
Makati. The sublease contract expired on 15
April 1993. However, Uy was not able to remove all her movable properties.
On 17 April 1993, an
argument arose between Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from
the subleased premises her remaining movable properties. The argument
degenerated into a scuffle between Uy, on the one hand, and Atayde and several
of Atayde's employees, including private respondent Winnie Javier, on the
other.
The
private respondents then filed a complaint with the barangay captain of
Valenzuela, Makati, however, during their scheduled confrontation before the
barangay captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor then filed two
informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC
of Makati.
Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the prematurity of the filing of the
criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings.
On the other
hand, private respondents contend that prior referral of the dispute to the
lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner are not residents of barangays
in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities
or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if
the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of
private respondent, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with
the requirement with the subsequent certification of the barangay to file the
action.
Judge
Contreras denied the motion to dismiss. The MR was likewise denied. Hence, Uy
filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the case should be dismissed
HELD:
While
P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing
of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior
referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
In
view of the respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation, no
complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC
of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of criminal cases was
premature and respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its
denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly,
Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the
parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe.
This is because pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of
sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their
complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela Makati.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in
Criminal Cases were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive
period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its
running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with
the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June
1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of
suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the
private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their
separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis
for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
Moreover,
having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela,
Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the
authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling
with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with
the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the
barangay conciliation system.
Neither
is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner did
not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela,
Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and invoked
the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.
Lastly,
nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that the parties
could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay
captain to issue a certification to file action. The request was nearly one and
a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a quo. Evidently,
this was done to support their contention that, in any event, there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. It must
be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial
confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to
demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
Petition
granted. Respondent judge was ordered to dismiss the case.
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