Wingarts vs Mejia

WINGARTS vs MEJIA

A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012.  March 20, 1995

FACTS:

Col. Munar filed criminal cases for malicious mischief (Crim Case 2663) and grave threats (Crim Case 2664) against Johan Wingarts. Wingarts filed a counter-charge against Col. Munar for usurpation of authority (Crim Case 2696). All three cases were decided by Judge Sevillano Mejia.

Crim Case 2663: Wingarts was acquitted

Crim Case 2664: The charge was dismissed

Crim Case 2696: Acquitted Col Munar 

Relative to the said judgments, Wingarts filed an administrative case against Judge Mejia for malicious delay in the administration of justice in relation to Crim Case 2663, alleging that the case dragged on for a year and four months in the Judges’ sala which was ultimately dismissed.

A second complaint for incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664  and issuing a warrant of arrest against Wingarts despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation.

The third complaint charged the judge for rendering an unjust decision in Crim case 2696, where Capt. Manuel and Col. Munar (military lawyers) appeared in the civil courts without necessary authorization.

ISSUES/HELD: 

1. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664 despite lack of prior barangay conciliation

The court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Court Administrator with regard to finding Judge Mejia liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law but not liable for malicious delay in the administration of justice nor for rendering an unjust 

Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of Crim Case 2664 despite the legal obstacles thereto. Under Sec 408 (c) of RA 7160 the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding (1) year or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos require a barangay conciliation. The crime of grave threats punishable under Art 282 of the RPC falls within the purview of Sec 408. Grave threats is punishable by aresto mayor (1 mo and 1 day to 6 mos) and a fine of not exceeding P500.

It has been repeatedly ruled that the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

Had the Judge taken cognizance of the law Sec 412 of RA 7160 he could have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking cognizance of the case and prematurely issuing a warrant of arrest. His actuations however are not tainted with malice or evil intent. The records reveal that he dismissed the case after motion of the defense and recalled the warrant issued. He is therefore ordered to pay the fine of 2,000 with a STERN WARNING.

2. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for malicious delay in administration of justice.

On the charge of malicious delay in administration of justice, the judge cannot be held liable. While there was some delay in the hearing, it does not appear to be malicious or deliberate, the judge should not be subjected to liabilities where delays are brought about by the parties and their lawyers. Litigants should not blame a judge for the delay which was not of his own making. It was found by the Court administrator that it was deemed submitted for decision on May 6, 1994 and was decided barely a month after on June 8, 1994.

3. Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for rending an unjust decision

As to the charge of rendering an unjust decision, to hold a judge liable it must be shown that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust, and (d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust.

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. As interpreted by Spanish Courts, the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.

The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive.

In a recent administrative case decided by this Court, it was reiterated that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 

The complainants dismally failed to convince the court that Judge Mejia knew that his challenged judgment is unjust. He based his decision on a circular of the Dept. of Defense, where Munar was authorized and were able to secure their permit to appear as private prosecutors, moreover according to Mejia a lack of permit does not strip them of their qualifications but merely calls for an administrative sanction. Judge Mejia also took judicial notice that Col Munar was a complainant in Crim Case 2663 and 2664.

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Corpuz vs CA

FACTS:

Alvarado and Corpuz were tenants of Lorenzo Barredo. In May 1988, Barredo decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase it. Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00 and thus, Alvarado became the tenant of Corpuz.

In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado to vacate the room which he was occupying because Corpuz’ children needed it for their own use. Alvarado refusal to vacate the room prompted Corpuz to file an action for unlawful detainer against the former with the MeTC of Manila for recovery of possession of said room.

In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses: (1) the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.

MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room. Alvarado appealed to the RTC.

RTC reversed MTC’s decision on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the NHA which must be resolved first by said agency. The "Affidavit of Waiver" was a forgery and dismissed the case for unlawful detainer. MR of Corpuz was denied.

CA affirmed in its entirety the RTC decision. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the NHA case impugning the sale of said property

2. WON the ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by PD1508

HELD:

1.  NO. MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto.

In Refugia v. CA, citing De la Santa vs. CA, it was held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot resolve the issue of ownership by declaring who among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer.

The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property. The underlying reason is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon.

Thus, the controversy pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties.

Alvarado is not without remedy. A judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

2. NO. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. In Dui v. CA, SC held that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. Alvarado's answer stated no reason or explanation to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment. The proceeding outlined in PD1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein. Petition granted. MTC decision reinstated. (Carlito D. Corpuz vs. CA and Juanito Alvarado, GR No. 117005, June 19, 1997)

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Uy vs Contreras

FACTS:

Petitioner Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building Makati. The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, Uy was not able to remove all her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between Uy, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private respondent Winnie Javier, on the other.

The private respondents then filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, however, during their scheduled confrontation before the barangay captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor then filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings. 

On the other hand, private respondents contend that prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable since she and petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of private respondent, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement with the subsequent certification of the barangay to file the action.

Judge Contreras denied the motion to dismiss. The MR was likewise denied. Hence, Uy filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed

HELD:

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In view of the respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled mediation, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of criminal cases was premature and respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay, persuasive. The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.

Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the respondent that the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The request was nearly one and a half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.

Petition granted. Respondent judge was ordered to dismiss the case.

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