Anti-Hazing Law Notes

What is hazing?

Hazing is as an initiation, rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

What does the term organization include?

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. 

Is the “training” in the PNP considered hazing?

The physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police are not considered as hazing for the purposes of Anti-Hazing Law.

What are the hazing requirements?

1. WRITTEN NOTICE. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. 

The written notice shall indicate:

1. the period of the initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days;

2. the names of those to be subjected to such activities; and, 

3. it must contain an undertaking that no physical violence be employed.

2. TWO REPRESENTATIVES. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least 2 representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant. (Section 3)  

Who shall be liable as PRINCIPALS if the person subjected to hazing suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof?

1. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals.

2. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring.  

3. The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed shall be liable as principals.

4. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring shall be liable as principal

5. The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

Who shall be liable as ACCOMPLICES?

1. The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.  

2. The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring.

A frat member alleged that it was not his intention to kill the recruit therefore he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance. Is his contention correct?

No. Any person charged under the anti-hazing law is not entitled to the mitigating circumstances of “there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong”.

What is the penalty for violation of Anti-Hazing Law?

The person or persons who participated in the hazing shall suffer:

1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation results there from.  

2) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent or blind.  

3) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member shall have become incapacitated for the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.  

4) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for more than 90 days.  

5) The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for more than 30 days.  

6) The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for 10 days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period. 

7) The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from 1 to 9 days, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.  

8) The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day to 6 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance. 

When will the maximum penalty be imposed for violations of the anti-hazing law?

The maximum penalty shall be imposed in any of the following instances:

1. When the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on the person of the recruit who refuses to join; 

2. When the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;  

3. When the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;

4. When the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or  

5. When the victim is below 12 years of age at the time of the hazing.

Could heads of institutions impose administrative sanctions to offenders of this law?

The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction. 

● Before the enactment of RA 8049, there was no law punishing the act of hazing. Hence, the courts had to look at the Revised Penal Code for the criminal liability of the accused. As such, in the Lenny Villa Case (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012), the accused were held liable for reckless imprudence resulting into homicide.


● The law states that it applies to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner above mentioned.  

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Anti-Alias Law Notes

Punishable act under C.A. No. 142 as amended by RA 6085:

Using any name different from the one with which a person was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court.

What are the instances when a second name can be used?

An individual can make use of a second name without infringing upon the law in the following instances:

1. As a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice;

2. When the use of the second name or alias is judicially authorized and duly recorded in the proper local civil registry;

3. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to a single person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth. 

Define alias.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170.  April 10, 1996)

There must be a “sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.” (People vs. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

What is the purpose of the law?

The purpose of the Anti-Alias Law is to prevent confusion and fraud in business transactions. 

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names.  C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the penalty for violation of Anti-Alias Law?

The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.

What is the prescriptive period for Anti-Alias Law?

The prescriptive period for the offense is 8 years. 

Section 1 of Act No. 3326 (as amended by Act 3763) provides: "Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: xxx (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; xxx. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment." 

How should C.A. No. 142 be construed?

C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Will the use of another name in a particular instance constitute use of an alias?

No. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner.  He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner.  There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.  For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.  There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

Cases:

● In the petition for naturalization it was alleged that appellant's full name is Anselmo Lim Hok Albano, alias Lim Hok alias Lim Hok Anselmo Albano. The decisive question to be determined is whether appellant's use of aliases comes within the contemplation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, otherwise known as the Anti-Alias Law. It is noteworthy that this law is not violated if one uses a name with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood. It is a matter of record that the name "Lim Hok" is one by which the appellant has been known since childhood and that, although he was baptized as Anselmo Lim Hok, he has always added "Albano", the surname of his godfather, Dionisio Albano, in connection with his business and social dealings, merely to emphasize his identity. There is no showing that confusion or prejudice ever was or has been caused by the addition of that surname, the effect that Commonwealth Act No. 142 seeks to prevent. We are not thus prepared to hold that the appellant has violated the Anti-Alias Law. (Anselmo Lim Hok Albano vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-10912, October 31, 1958)

● Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law. (Ong Hock Lian vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966)

● The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. According to the provisions of Act 3326 (as amended by Act 3763), covering prescription of offenses punished by special laws, the prescriptive period for the offense charged is eight (8) years. Considering that the Information was filed on March 13, 1984 charging petitioner with violation of the Anti-Alias Law "on or about July 17, 1961, and subsequent thereto", or twenty-three (23) years later to be exact, it is clear that, by prescription, the People has lost the right to prosecute the crime.

The principle cited by the prosecution and sustained by the Appellate Court that the prescription of a continuing offense starts to run from the date of the last illegal use of the unauthorized alias sued upon, is inapplicable to this case. As Judge Bagasao had pointed out in his dismissal Order:

Public records consisting of the accused's petition for naturalization, his marriage contract, his passport dated August 21, 1967, alien certificate of registration No. 3116 dated November 20, 1963, ACR No. 2267733 dated August 4, 1949, Immigration Certificate of Registration (ICR) No. 37922 dated August 4, 1949, show that the accused had already used publicly the name Tahilram J. Balani and the government authorities are deemed to have known the alleged violation.

Where the offense has not been concealed, as when the offense is evidenced by a public record open to inspection, the State will not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused, in order to evade the operation of the Statute of Limitations. (Balani vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69537, June 20, 1986)

● The rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known.  In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.  In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.  The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible.  All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. 

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.  Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.  We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions.  This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly (People vs. Estrada, ibid.).   

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Republic Act No. 10158

 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10158 

AN ACT DECRIMINALIZING VAGRANCY, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLE 202 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby, amended to read as follows:

“Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. – For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

“Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period toprision correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.”

SEC. 2. Effect on Pending Cases. – All pending cases under the provisions of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be dismissed upon effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 3. Immediate Release of Convicted Persons. – All persons serving sentence for violation of the provisions of  Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code on Vagrancy prior to its amendment by this Act shall be immediately released upon effectivity of this Act: Provided, That they are not serving sentence or detained for any other offense or felony.

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations and other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 27, 2012

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Arbitrary Detention

Classes of Arbitrary Detention

(1) Arbitrary detention by detaining a person without legal ground

(2) Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities

(3) Delaying release

Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person, shall suffer;

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;

3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not more than six months; and

4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any person.

Elements:

1.   That the offender is a public officer or employee

2.   That he detains a person

3.   That the detention is without legal grounds

Public officer or employee

The offender in arbitrary detention is a public officer or employee who must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a person, they have no legal grounds.

Eg. policemen, mayors or judges

Illegal detention

If the detention is perpetrated by other public officers, the crime committed may be illegal detention, because they are acting in their private capacity.

Private individuals who conspired

Private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain policemen are guilty of arbitrary detention.

When is there a detention?

When a person is placed in confinement or there is a restraint on his person.

“Without legal grounds”

1.   When he has not committed any crime or, at least, there is no reasonable ground for suspicion that he has committed a crime; OR

2.   When he is not suffering from violent insanity or any other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital.

Legal grounds for the detention of a person

1.   The commission of a crime;

2.   Violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital.

Arrest without a warrant – when lawful

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a.   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b.   When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c.   When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place  where he is serving judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

  

Exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest must be strictly construed. Otherwise, it would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic rule so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

Arrest without warrant is the usual cause of arbitrary detention.

Meaning of “in his presence”

-     Officer sees the offense being committed although at a distance, OR

-     Hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene OR

-     When the offense is continuing or has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made

Personal knowledge is required

A crime must in fact or actually have been committed

In arbitrary detention, the legality of the detention does not depend upon the juridical and much less the judicial fact of a  crime, which at the time of the commission, is not and cannot definitely be determined for lack of necessary data and of jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the deed. It being sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the same ground exist for him to believe that the person sought to be detained participated herein.

The actual commission of a crime by the person detained is not necessary to justify his detention. No reasonable ground if officer only wants to know the commission of crime.

That the police officer can make an arrest on mere complaint of the offended party is a debatable question.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

Being a prisoner who has escaped, he can be arrested without a warrant of arrest not only by the authorities but also by any private person. Reason: the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime – by evading the serving of his sentence.

Periods of detention penalized

1.   if the detention has not exceeded three days

2.   if the detention has continued more than three days but not more than 15 days

3.   if the detention has continued more than 15 days but not more than 6 months

4.   if the detention has exceeded 6 months

The law does not fix any minimum period of detention.

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