Anti-Alias Law Notes

Punishable act under C.A. No. 142 as amended by RA 6085:

Using any name different from the one with which a person was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court.

What are the instances when a second name can be used?

An individual can make use of a second name without infringing upon the law in the following instances:

1. As a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice;

2. When the use of the second name or alias is judicially authorized and duly recorded in the proper local civil registry;

3. The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to a single person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth. 

Define alias.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170.  April 10, 1996)

There must be a “sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.” (People vs. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

What is the purpose of the law?

The purpose of the Anti-Alias Law is to prevent confusion and fraud in business transactions. 

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names.  C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

What is the penalty for violation of Anti-Alias Law?

The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00.

What is the prescriptive period for Anti-Alias Law?

The prescriptive period for the offense is 8 years. 

Section 1 of Act No. 3326 (as amended by Act 3763) provides: "Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: xxx (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; xxx. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment." 

How should C.A. No. 142 be construed?

C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Will the use of another name in a particular instance constitute use of an alias?

No. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner.  He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner.  There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.  For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.  There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. (Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.)

Cases:

● In the petition for naturalization it was alleged that appellant's full name is Anselmo Lim Hok Albano, alias Lim Hok alias Lim Hok Anselmo Albano. The decisive question to be determined is whether appellant's use of aliases comes within the contemplation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, otherwise known as the Anti-Alias Law. It is noteworthy that this law is not violated if one uses a name with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood. It is a matter of record that the name "Lim Hok" is one by which the appellant has been known since childhood and that, although he was baptized as Anselmo Lim Hok, he has always added "Albano", the surname of his godfather, Dionisio Albano, in connection with his business and social dealings, merely to emphasize his identity. There is no showing that confusion or prejudice ever was or has been caused by the addition of that surname, the effect that Commonwealth Act No. 142 seeks to prevent. We are not thus prepared to hold that the appellant has violated the Anti-Alias Law. (Anselmo Lim Hok Albano vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-10912, October 31, 1958)

● Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law. (Ong Hock Lian vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966)

● The penalty provided by the Anti-Alias Law for violation of the terms thereof is imprisonment from one to five years and a fine of P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. According to the provisions of Act 3326 (as amended by Act 3763), covering prescription of offenses punished by special laws, the prescriptive period for the offense charged is eight (8) years. Considering that the Information was filed on March 13, 1984 charging petitioner with violation of the Anti-Alias Law "on or about July 17, 1961, and subsequent thereto", or twenty-three (23) years later to be exact, it is clear that, by prescription, the People has lost the right to prosecute the crime.

The principle cited by the prosecution and sustained by the Appellate Court that the prescription of a continuing offense starts to run from the date of the last illegal use of the unauthorized alias sued upon, is inapplicable to this case. As Judge Bagasao had pointed out in his dismissal Order:

Public records consisting of the accused's petition for naturalization, his marriage contract, his passport dated August 21, 1967, alien certificate of registration No. 3116 dated November 20, 1963, ACR No. 2267733 dated August 4, 1949, Immigration Certificate of Registration (ICR) No. 37922 dated August 4, 1949, show that the accused had already used publicly the name Tahilram J. Balani and the government authorities are deemed to have known the alleged violation.

Where the offense has not been concealed, as when the offense is evidenced by a public record open to inspection, the State will not be permitted to plead ignorance of the act of the accused, in order to evade the operation of the Statute of Limitations. (Balani vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69537, June 20, 1986)

● The rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known.  In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.  In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time.  The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible.  All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity. 

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.  Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.  We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions.  This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly (People vs. Estrada, ibid.).