WHITE
LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time
Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels,
Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.”
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid
and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light
Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation
filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC.
On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The City then filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same
to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised
Manila charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the
ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the
ordinance is unconstitutional
HELD: Yes.
For an
ordinance to be a legitimate exercise of police power,
(1) It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive of private rights.
(2) It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
(3) A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment.
Lacking a
concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the
exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.
It cannot be denied that the primary
animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained
notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since
they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’” Whether
or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be
denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting
single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.
We cannot
discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more
than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel
or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit
passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose
for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of
persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with
purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to
staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in
illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents
legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of.
A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The
behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
We reiterate that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of
its citizens. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well
as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense
of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to
protect.
● The
apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned
the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
0
Comments
