TUZON AND MAPAGU vs. CA
G.R. No.
90107. August 21, 1992
FACTS:
On 14
March 1977, Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No.
9 soliciting 1% donation of the palay threshed from the thresher operators who
will apply for a permit to thresh. The proceeds will fund the construction of
the Sports and Nutrition Center Bldg of the municipality. Petitioner Lope
Mapagu (treasurer) prepared a document for signature of all thresher/ owner/
operators who applied for a mayor’s permit. Private respondent Jurado tried to
pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators but it was refused on the
ground that he must first get a mayor’ permit (by Mapagu) and second, the he
did not sign the agreement to give 1% of the palay he produced (by Mayor
Tuzon).
Jurado
filed for an action for mandamus with the RTC in Aparri, Cagayan (CFI then) to
compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit and license. He filed another
petition for declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal
either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the same
respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan
The trial
court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement.
Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable to pay actual and moral damages for
acting maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application for
the mayor's permit and license. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the
Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted by Article
XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU shall have
the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29, PD
231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other contributions
from private agencies and individuals.
ISSUES/HELD:
1: WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is
a valid exercise of the taxing power of an LGU.
NO. The
implementing agency made the “donation” obligatory. Although again the validity
of the resolution was not in issue, the SC observed that: it “seems to make the
donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's
permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of
liberality and is never obligatory. If it is to be considered as a tax
ordinance, it must be shown: 1. to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements
of the Local Tax Code; 2. it would include the holding of a public hearing on
the measure; and 3. its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in
addition to the requisites for publication of ordinances in general.
2. WON
petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having
withheld from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to
comply with Resolution No. 9.
NO.Petitioners
acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on
its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its
legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality,
they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. xxx As a rule, a pubic officer,
whether, judicial, quasi-‐judicial
or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act
performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his
official duty. xxx It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an
ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith, that would
entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd.
v. City of Cebu)
The private respondent anchors his claim for
damages on Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any
person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
In the present case, it has not even been
alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain
approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the
municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in
refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence
has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private
respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood
to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and
license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurado's business competitors nor
has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the
contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all
the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference.
The private respondent complains that as a
result of the petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his business
all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in previous
years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the
prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it
in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite,
he could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the
lucrocesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful
act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still dissentient action,
without loss of face, or principle, or profit.
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