COQUILLA vs COMELEC
G.R.
No. 151914, September 17, 2002, 385 SCRA 607
Facts:
Coquilla was born on
1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after
joining the US Navy.
In1998, he came to
the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually
applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November
10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000,
he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which
was approved in 2001.
On February 27, 2001,
he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez,
who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras
was a material representation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his
oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC
could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the
winner.
On July 19, 2001,
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this
petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the
COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the
proclamation of petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner
had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of
candidacy
3. Whether the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the
running of the period for filing this petition for certiorari because the
motion was pro forma.
Held:
1. Yes. R.A. No. 6646
provides:
SECTION
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that
candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not
be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those
against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be
voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC
suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or
cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for
disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of
certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should
continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
2. No. Section 39(a)
of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective
local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
The term “residence”
is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile
of choice).
In the case at bar,
petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965.
From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien.
In Caasi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by
virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in
that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
3. It is contended
that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not
suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion
was pro forma.
The mere reiteration
in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed
upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the
movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial
or some other remedy.
In the cases where a
motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held
because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[or (2) it did not
comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and
conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or
(3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely
alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse
party was not given notice thereof.
The 16-page motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from
none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule
that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the
allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his earlier pleadings or did
not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running
of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier
shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
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