REPUBLIC
vs. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883.
January 13, 2004
FACTS:
Chule
Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she
was born on 29 October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan
transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. the Court finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance ordered the publication of the hearing of the
petition.
During
the hearing, Lim testifies that:
1. Her
surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using
"Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate.She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".
2. She
claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu
To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).
3. Her
nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino
considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased
father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a
registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
4. It
was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate
child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married. She also presented a certification attested by
officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To
from 1948 to the present.
The
RTC granted the petition and directed the civil register of Iligan City to make
the following corrections in the birth records of Lim:
1.
Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2.
Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO
TIAN)";
3.
Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing
"YES" to "NO" in answer to the question
"LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4.
Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
Petitioner Republic appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner
claims that Lim never complied with the legal requirement in electing her
citizenship. Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals’ decision in allowing
respondent to use her father’s surname despite its finding that she is
illegitimate.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her
citizenship
2.
Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use her father’s surname despite its
finding that she is illegitimate.
HELD:
1.
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
Plainly,
the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with
said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino
citizen. By being an illegitimate
child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated differently, she
is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.
This
notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority.
She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
2.
The Republic’s submission is misleading.
The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father’s
surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever
since she can remember. In this regard,
respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s
surname.
Firstly,
Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.
To bar her at this time from using her father’s surname which she has
used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion. Concededly, one of the
reasons allowed for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly,
under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of
aliases, a person is allowed to use a name “by which he has been known since
childhood.”
Thirdly,
the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar
v. Rep. of the Phils., we held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142,
which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name “by which he
has been known since childhood” (Lim Hok
Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679;
Republic v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the
illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).
While
judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already
been using since childhood.
The
doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression
of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to
the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.
In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would
probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent’s case, the change in the
surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her
community in general.
CA
decision is affirmed.