Republic vs Chule Lim

REPUBLIC vs. CHULE Y. LIM

G.R. No. 153883.  January 13, 2004

FACTS:

Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29 October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. the Court finding the petition sufficient in form and substance ordered the publication of the hearing of the petition.

During the hearing, Lim testifies that:

1. Her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate.She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu".

2. She claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

3. Her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

4. It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. She also presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.

The RTC granted the petition and directed the civil register of Iligan City to make the following corrections in the birth records of Lim:

1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";

2. Her father’s name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";

3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,

4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".

Petitioner Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner claims that Lim never complied with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship. Petitioner also assails the Court of Appeals’ decision in allowing respondent to use her father’s surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship

2. Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use her father’s surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

HELD:

1. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.  It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.  The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married.  As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen.  By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.  Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.  She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

2. The Republic’s submission is misleading.  The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father’s surname.  What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember.  In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.

Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old.  To bar her at this time from using her father’s surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion.  Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion.

Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name “by which he has been known since childhood.”

Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue.  In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., we held: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name “by which he has been known since childhood” (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief.  In respondent’s case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.

CA decision is affirmed. 

read more...

Teresita Llaneta vs. Hon. Corazon J. Agrava

Facts:

Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about 4 years later, Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita Llaneta was born. Atanacia brought Teresita and Victoriano to Manila where they lived with Serafin’s mother.  

Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings throughout her schooling. When she was 21 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.  

She filed a petition for change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use of the surname Llaneta would cause untold difficulties and confusion. The trial court denied the petition relying on the 3 decisions of the Supreme Court that disallows a change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship.

Issue:

Whether or not the change of surname should allowed

Held:

Yes. Teresita has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.

The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. (Teresita Llaneta vs. Hon. Corazon J. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054 May 15, 1974)

read more...

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from “Vicencio” to “Yu”. Cynthia alleged that she was born on 19 January 1971 in Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On 10 January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode. Since then,  Pablo Vicencio  never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of her mother. On 15 April 1986, her mother and Ernesto Yu got married. 

Since her childhood, she had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite of which she had been using the family name “Vicencio” in her school and other activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and she  had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment. On two (2) occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu. Her step-father had been consulted about the petition and had given his consent thereto.

The trial court granted the petition. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that it is for the best interest of Cynthia that her surname be changed.

Issue:

Whether the change of Cynthia’s surname to that of her step-father’s surname was proper.

Held:

We have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited.  She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her.  Since she is known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment.  

The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant private respondent’s change of surname.  Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that private respondent’s step-father has two (2) children with her mother.  In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a “legitimate” daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor General, opines that “Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’  for which the change is sought.” The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that  legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.

Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father.  It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.

Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent’s parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.

Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, the Court ruled that:

“To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother’s second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.”

Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father’s legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood.  However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent’s desire to use  her stepfather’s surname.

Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Cynthia Vicencio, G.R. No. 88202.  December 14, 1998)

read more...