VALLES
vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
FACTS:
In
1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected governor
of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However,
finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for
re-election in 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition
for disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition
was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
The
citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner
Cirilo Valles.
The
COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her
father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle
of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a
Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and
that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian
passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54
and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run
for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner
thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that
the Lopez is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts
that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied
for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was
issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether respondent is a Filipino
2.
If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR
and being issued an Australian passport.
3.
Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao
Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
HELD:
1.
Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen
and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution
of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of
Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The
principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
2.
No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1)
By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2)
By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3)
By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4)
By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5)
By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6)
By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted: and
(7)
In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws
in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In
order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. The mere fact that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As
held by this court in the case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had
dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover,
under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born
in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s
Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s
claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
3.
In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as
used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV,
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations
in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also
a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No.
7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”
Thus,
the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon
the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then,
too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly
registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on
May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled,
as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly
appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue
of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go
through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
4.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging
the same, citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. He
insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner
is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of
Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court
ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s
citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is
a party;
2) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and
3) the finding on
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although
the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make
the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on
the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC
92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private
respondent. The evidence adduced by
petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior
cases. Petitioner failed to show any new
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However,
the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition
cannot prosper.
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