Reyes vs Comelec

REYES vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996

FACTS:

Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against incumbent Mayor Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the order.

Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.

The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor.  Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer.

ISSUES:

1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.

2. WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic

3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.

HELD:

1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyes’s refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.  In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.

2.  No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.  If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.  This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases.  Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President.  He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to § 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case.  The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer.  He failed to do so.  Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.  But on the date set, he failed to appear.  He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon.  This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.

3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.  He lost the elections.  He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.  We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

● Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments either personally or by mail.  Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioner’s counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. 

In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel’s refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioner’s counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.  Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, § 67. But petitioner did not do so.  Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.

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People vs. Jalosjos

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held:

NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. (People vs. Jalosjos

G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)

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Aguinaldo vs. Santos

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. 

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court.  As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.  

Issues:

1.  WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. 

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337. 

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

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