Pimentel vs Aguirre

PIMENTEL vs. AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000

FACTS:

President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption of Economic Measures in Government for Fiscal Year 1998). Section 1 provided that all government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, GOCCs and LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items. Section 4 also provided that pending assessment by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld. President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be withheld.

ISSUES:

1. WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid

2. WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid

HELD:

1. Yes. Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce expenditures by at least 25% is a valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs as it is advisory only.  “Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.” Under existing law, LGU, in addition to having administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well.  Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.  It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.

Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.  Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.  However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units."  The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x In the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year   x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: 

(1) An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;

(2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and

(3) The corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.  Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372.  At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.  Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments.  Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments.  It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties.  Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.  Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President.  Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance  that  the  directive  to  "identify and implement measures  x x x  that will reduce total expenditures  x x x  by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy.  The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty.  Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis.  It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice.  It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.

2. No. Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy, particularly local fiscal autonomy.  A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.  This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country.  Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.  Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter.  Any retention is prohibited.

Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision.  It reads as follows:

"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.  x x x"

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.  In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government.  It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent.  The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x  In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.  If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.  Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes.  He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.  "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further delineated.  Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act.  If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves.  On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority.  Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them.  If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules.  They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.  They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos.  As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people.  Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.  By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers.  By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."  The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x  not  x x x  to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units  x x x."  Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments.  Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.  There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous.  In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.  According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.  Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.  The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.  In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development.  But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.  Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.  As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.

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Aguinaldo vs. Santos

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. 

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court.  As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.  

Issues:

1.  WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. 

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337. 

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

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Powers of the President: Diplomatic or Treaty-Making Power

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate. (Art. VII, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

Applicability

This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the

Senate to be valid and effective.

Who has the power to ratify treaties?

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. 

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation’s foreign policy; his “dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded.” Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether." 

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion. 

It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])

What is a treaty?

A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is “an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.”

There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi.  All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no significance.  Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.

Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.” (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.)

What are executive agreements?

Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions.

They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.

Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.) (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 351)

Distinction between international agreements and executive agreements

1. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. 

2. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.  (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, ibid.) 

Discuss the binding effect of treaties and executive agreements in international law.

In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.)

Does the Philippines recognize the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress?

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.  In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (ibid.), we had occasion to pronounce:

“xxx the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.  From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.   The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts." (Bayan vs. Zamora, ibid.)

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Powers of the President: Budgetary Power

Sec. 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art. VII, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

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Powers of the President: Borrowing Power

Sec. 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Limitations:

1. There must be prior concurrence of the Monetary Board

2. It is subject to such other limitations

The President of the Philippines authorized the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to negotiate and sign a loan agreement with the German Government forthe construction of a dam. The Senate, by a resolution, asked that the agreement be submitted to it for ratification. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs advised the Secretary of Public Works and Highways not to comply with the request of the Senate. Is the President bound to submit the agreement to the Senate for ratification? (Bar Question 1994, No. 13) 

No, the President is not bound to submit the agreement to the Senate for ratification. Under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution, only the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board is required for the President to contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

What are the restrictions prescribed by the Constitution on the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines? Explain. (Bar Question 1999, No. 1) 

Under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution, the power of the President to contract or guarantee loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is subject to the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by law.

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Powers of the President: Informing Power

Sec. 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

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Powers of the President: Impoundment

Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.

- prevent the release of certain budget appropriations

Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of the authority of the President.

1. Authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress

2. The executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief

3. Faithful Execution Clause

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506)

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Powers of the President: Pardoning Power

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Art. VII, Sec. 19, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

● Exercise by the President: Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts unless there is violation of the Constitution.

Definitions

1. Pardon — an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from punishment which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.

a. Plenary or partial

b. Absolute or conditional

Conditional pardon — is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one.

2. Commutation — reduction or mitigation of penalty

3. Reprieve — postponement of sentence or stay of execution

4. Parole — release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is in custody of the law although not in confinement

5. Amnesty — act of grace, concurred in by the Legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

Distinction between Pardon and Amnesty

Amnesty	Pardon
1. granted for political offenses	1. granted for any offense
2. granted to classes of persons or communities	2. granted to individuals
3. may be granted at any time	3. granted after final conviction
4. need not be accepted	4. must be accepted
5. requires the concurrence of congress	5. does not need the concurrence of congress
6. public act which the court may take judicial notice	6. private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned
7. looks backward and puts the offense into oblivion	7. looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of his offense

Limitations on the exercise of the pardoning power:

1. Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;

2. Cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable recommendations of the COMELEC;

3. Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty);

4. Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt;

5. Cannot absolve convict of civil liability;

6. Cannot restore public offices forfeited.

Cases:

● Person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished (People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000)

● To avail of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation (Vera vs. People, 7 SCRA 152)

● Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon.

Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995)

● In Llamas vs. Orbos, pardon is available also to one found guilty of administrative offense. Section 19 of Article VII did not distinguish between a criminal and administrative offense.

● Effect of grant of pardon: In the case of Monsanto vs. Factoran (170 SCRA 190 (1989), the accused was convicted of malversation thru falsification of official documents. She was granted absolute pardon. She demanded for reinstatement and back salaries. The SC held that pardon may mean forgiveness but not forgetfulness. What was remitted is the penalty and not the fact of one’s guilt. In the eyes of law, she was still a convict.

Exceptions:

1. Unless the grant expressly so provides for her reinstatement and payment of back salaries.

2. If the grant of pardon was based on the fact of the innocence of the one charged of the crime.

●  Section 19, Article VII is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finality. In truth, an accused that has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in the state of insanity. (See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code)

Article 81 of the Revised Penal code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times. For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution, and the applicable statute as when the date of execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by court. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, 1999)

People vs. Casido, G.R. 116512,  March 7, 1997

People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, September 7, 1995

Sabello vs. DECS, 180 SCRA 623 (1989)

Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991)

Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1941)

Pelobello vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 27 (1987)

In Re Lontok, 43 Phil 293 (1923)

Garcia vs. Chairman, COA G.R. 75025, September 14, 1993

Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273  (1987)

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