Magno vs Comelec

Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.

COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.  Likewise, he claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the law applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC.  Said provision reads:

Section 40. Disqualifications. -  The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

xxx

Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000.  Thus, he was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.

Issue: Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude

Held: Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and

4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element.  The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.

Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: What law should apply in the case?

Held: The Local Government Code.

The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local Government Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.

Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of the OEC.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.

Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 2000.  (G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002)

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Antichresis

Define antichresis

Antichresis is a contract by virtue of which the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (Art. 2132, CC)

Characteristics of antichresis

1. Accessory contract

2. Formal contract - it must be in writing

3. Deal only with immovable property

4. Real right

5. Real contract

6. Can guarantee all kinds of valid obligations. 

It is not essential that the loan should earn interest in order that it can be guaranteed with a contract of antichresis. Antichresis is susceptible of guaranteeing all kinds of obligations, pure or conditional. (Javier vs. Valliser, No. 2648-R, April 29, 1950; Sta. Rosa vs. Noble, 35 O.G. 27241)

Delivery of the property to the creditor is required only in order that the creditor may receive the fruits and not for the validity of the contract.

How is a contract of antichresis be validly established?

The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the contract of antichresis shall be void.  (Art. 2134, CC)

How should the amount of payment in antichresis be determined?

The actual market value of the fruits at the time of the application thereof to the interest and principal shall be the measure of such application. (Art. 2133, CC)

What are the obligations of the creditor?

1.) The creditor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, is obliged to pay the taxes and charges upon the estate.

2.) He is also bound to bear the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair. The sums spent for the purposes stated in this article shall be deducted from the fruits. (Art. 2135, CC)

3.) To apply the fruits received for the payment of the outstanding interest, if any, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.

How can the creditor be exempted from the obligations imposed by Art. 2135, CC?

The creditor may exempt himself from the two obligations imposed by Art. 2135 by compelling the debtor to enter again upon the enjoyment of the property, except when there is a stipulation to the contrary. (Art. 2136, CC)

Can the debtor reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable?

The debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.

But the latter, in order to exempt himself from the obligations imposed upon him by the preceding article, may always compel the debtor to enter again upon the enjoyment of the property, except when there is a stipulation to the contrary. (Art. 2136, CC)

The property delivered stands as a security for the payment of the obligation of the debtor in antichresis. Hence, the debtor cannot demand its return until the debt is totally paid. 

The debtor can only demand the return of the property after having fully paid his obligations to the creditor. It is not fair for the creditor to regain the possession of the property when his debt has not been fully paid. Until there is full payment of the obligation, the property shall stand as security therefor. (Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, No. 18574, September 20, 1922, 43 Phil 770)

May the creditor acquire ownership of the real estate for non-payment of debt?

The creditor does not acquire the ownership of the real estate for non-payment of the debt within the period agreed upon. Every stipulation to the contrary shall be void. (Art. 2137, CC)

What is the remedy of the creditor in case of non-payment of his credit?

The creditor may petition the court for the payment of the debt or the sale of the real property. In this case, the Rules of Court on the foreclosure of mortgages shall apply. (Art. 2137, CC)

1. Action for collection

2. Petition for the public sale of the property

Interest be compensated with the fruits

The contracting parties may stipulate that the interest upon the debt be compensated with the fruits of the property which is the object of the antichresis, provided that if the value of the fruits should exceed the amount of interest allowed by the laws against usury, the excess shall be applied to the principal. (Art. 2138, CC)

Is prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership available to the creditor in antichresis?

No. An antichretic creditor cannot acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The creditor is not a possessor in the concept of owner butmere holder placed in possession of the land by the owner. Hence, their possession cannot serve as title for acquiring dominion. (Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38185, September 24, 1986)

Antichresis vs. contract of sale with a right of repurchase

1) Antichresis is an accessory contract, whereas sale with right of repurchase is a principal and independent contract.

2) In the first, there is no transfer of the title over the property from the debtor to the creditor, whereas in the second there is a transfer of the title over the property from the vendor a retro to the vendee a retro although conditional.

3) In the first, if the debtor fails to pay his debt, the creditor cannot appropriate the property or dispose of it, whereas in the second, as soon as there is a consolidation of title in the vendee a retro, he may dispose of it as absolute owner.

4) In the first, if the debtor fails to pay his debt within the time agreed upon, the creditor does not acquire the ownership of the property, whereas in the second, if the vendor a retro does not redeem the property within the time agreed upon, the vendee a retro irrevocably acquires absolute ownership thereof.

Antichresis vs. pledge

1) Antichresis is a consensual contract whereas pledge is a real contract.

2) In the first, the subject matter is a real property, whereas in the second, the subject matter is a personal property.

3) In the first, the requirement that the contract must be in writing is essential for validity, whereas in the second, the requirement that the contact must be in public instrument is merely for the purpose of binding third persons. 

4) In the first, the foreclosure in case of non-payment of debt is as a rule judicial, although the parties may agree to make it extrajudicial whereas in the second, the sale in case of non-payment of the debt is always extrajudicial.

Antichresis vs. real estate mortgage

1) In antichresis, the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of the property, but with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest and thereafter to the principal of his credit, whereas in real estate mortgage, the creditor does not acquire such right.

2) In the first, the creditor as a rule is in possession of the property, whereas in the second, the debtor is always in possession of the property.

3) In the first, the requirement that the contract must be in writing is essential for validity, whereas in the second, the requirement that the contact must be registered in the Registry of Property is merely for the purpose of binding third persons.

4) In the first, there is an obligation of the creditor to pay taxes and charges upon the property as well as the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair, whereas in the second, such obligation is not imposed upon the creditor.

5) In the first, foreclosure in case of non-payment of debts is a rule judicial, although the parties may agree to make it extra-judicial, whereas in the second, the foreclosure may be judicial or extra-judicial at the option of the creditor. 

A obtains a loan of P500 from B and delivers to the latter a piece of coconut land as security for the payment of the loan. In the deed executed, A agreed that B would avail of the fruits of the land during the time that the loan remains unpaid, without saying that the value of said fruits should be applied to the interest or the capital of the loan. What is the nature of the contract between the parties?

It is submitted that the contract in this case is a type of equitable mortgage, because, although it lacks some of the formalities required by law, nevertheless, it shows the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for the payment of a debt and contains nothing that is contrary to law (Art. 1602, CC). Strictly speaking, it cannot be considered a contract of antichresisbecause it lacks the requisite regarding the obligation of the creditor to apply the fruits received by him to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (Art. 1232, CC) In spite of the fact that it is a type of equitable mortgage where the mortgagee is in possession, it has been held by the Supreme Court, however, that the rights and obligations of the parties are similar and in any respect identical with those in a contract of antichresis. (Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, 43 Phil 770; Diaz vs. Mendezona, 48 Phil 666; Miranda vs. Imperial, 77 Phil 1066) 

In 1941 D borrowed P2,000 from C. As security for the loan, the former conveyed to the latter a parcel of unregistered land. This conveyance is evidenced by a deed which the parties call “sangla” or “prenda” in the dialect. The records show that since 1941 C had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property, and that in 1950, the tax declaration was changed to his name. In 1958 D died survived by his son X. Subsequently, X brought an action against C for the recovery of the land and for an accounting of the fruits. C, however, interposed the defense of prescription. Decide.

X’s action against C will prosper. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the contract in this case indicates a mortgage which, coupled with the delivery of possession of the land to the creditor, amounts to a contract of antichresis (Diaz vs. Mendezona, 48 Phil. 666; Miranda vs. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1066; Trillana vs. Manansala, 51 Off. Gaz. 2911).

BAR Q& A

Olivia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly manage due to a lingering illness. Since she is indebted to Peter in the amount of P500.000.00 she asks Peter to manage the plantation and apply the harvest to the payment of her obligation to him, principal and interest, until her indebtedness shall have been fully paid. Peter agrees. 1) What kind of contract is entered into between Olivia and Peter? Explain. 2) What specific obligations are imposed by law on Peter as a consequence of their contract? 3) Does the law require any specific form for the validity of their contract? Explain 4) May Olivia re-acquire the plantation before her entire indebtedness shall have been fully paid? Explain. (1995)

Suggested Answer:

1. A contract of antichresis was entered into between Olivia and Peter. Under Article 2132 of the New Civil Code, by a contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.

2. Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and bear the necessary expenses for preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art, 2135, NCC)

3. The amount of the principal and interest must be specified in writing, otherwise the antichresis will be void. (Art. 2134, NCC)

4.  No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor. However, it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do so in order to exempt him from his obligation under Art. 2135, NCC, The debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment unless Peter compels Olivia to enter again the enjoyment of the property. 

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Rodriguez vs. Comelec

Facts:  

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari  to the Supreme Court,  it was  held that:  Fugitive  from justice  includes not  only those  who flee after conviction  to avoid punishment,  but  also those  who after  being charged,  flee to avoid  prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:  

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099.  July 24, 1996)

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Caasi vs Court of Appeals

Facts: 

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

Sec. 68.  Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Held:   No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held:   Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)

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Marquez vs Comelec

Facts:  

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40.    Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

         xxx         

(e)   Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then. 

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. 

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR. 

Issue: 

What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed? 

Held: 

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. 

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. 

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. 

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)

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Dela Torre vs Comelec

Facts: 

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40.  Disqualifications.  The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

“(a)  Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;”

 

Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he was granted probation by the MTC. 

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability. 

Held: 

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:

1.  A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element.  Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.  And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to xxx accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.

2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)

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P.D. No. 1613

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1613

AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON

WHEREAS, findings of the police and intelligence agencies of the government reveal that fires and other crimes involving destruction in Metro Manila and other urban centers in the country are being perpetuated by criminal syndicates, some of which have foreign connections;

WHEREAS, the current law on arson suffer from certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction be prevented to protect the national economy and preserve the social economic and political stability of the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land, the following:

Sec. 1. Arson. — Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by Prision mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.

Sec. 2. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of Reclusion temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishment where explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are stored.

2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social services.

3. Any church or place or worship or other building where people usually assemble.

4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or property.

5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official proceedings.

6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building.

7. Any building, whether used as dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.

Sec. 3. Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty of Reclusion temporal to Reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any uninhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain filed, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;

5. Any rice mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

Sec. 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. — The penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:

1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.

Sec. 5. Where Death Results From Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.

Sec. 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. — Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.

2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.

3. Gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked therewith or containers, thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.

4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.

5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.

6. If shortly before the fire a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.

7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.

Sec. 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. — Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.

Sec. 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. — The building which is the object of arson including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.

Sec. 9. Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and all laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Sec. 10. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication thereof at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila this 7th day of March nineteen hundred and seventy nine.

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